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Abstract 
 
This work seeks to address a paradox between the existing literature on political 
disaffection and participation in new democracies through a comparative study of Chile 
and Argentina.  According to Torcal and Lago (2006), disaffection in new democracies is 
associated with less conventional and nonconventional forms of participation.  While on 
an individual basis their conclusions hold true in Chile and Argentina, the comparisons 
on a national level do not fit this pattern - despite the higher levels of disaffection in 
Argentina, it has similar or higher levels of participation.  This paper employs Sidney 
Tarrow‟s theoretical framework of opportunity structures (1994, 1995) to test the causal 
pathway from the transitions to democracy to current participation, concluding that:  1) 
that the type of transition results in context-specific institutional and perceptional 
opportunity structures that facilitate some types of participation and inhibit others, which, 
in the case of the Chilean controlled transition led to primarily electoral participation, 
compared to the induced transition in Argentina that allowed for all types of 
participation; and 2) that the repertoires of post-authoritarian participation formed after 
the transition interact with current political institutions to create current opportunity 
structures that produce different characteristics of political participation – almost 
exclusively electoral in Chile, compared to a broader variety and number of participants 
in Argentina. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
Disaffection and Participation: Addressing a Paradox 
This work seeks to address a paradox between the existing literature on political 
disaffection and participation in new democracies through a comparative study of Chile and 
Argentina.  In most circumstances, political disaffection is associated with less non-electoral 
participation and less political involvement and, more specific to the Latin American region, 
Torcal and Lago determined that political disaffection in new democracies “has a dominant and 
strong „demobilizing effect‟, thereby contributing to the widespread estrangement of citizens 
from politics”, the undermining of representative accountability and the reduction of 
conventional and nonconventional participation (2006).  The overall conclusion of the current 
literature on political disaffection holds that when there is more disaffection, there will be less 
participation.
1
  These theories, although true at the individual-level of analysis in Argentina and 
Chile, do not explain the national comparison, and in fact, the data from public opinion polls 
contradict their conclusions.
2
  As the following analysis will demonstrate, although Argentine 
citizens display higher levels of disaffection, they participate a similar or greater amount and 
generally in a wider variety of ways than Chilean citizens.  If the cases of Argentina and Chile 
were to fit the established theories, one would expect all levels of participation to be lower in 
Argentina than in Chile, given their higher levels of political disaffection.   
 
 
                                                          
1
 For more theories on political disaffection see Torcal and Montero, 1996; Pharr and Putnam, 2001. 
2
 A quantitative analysis of the LAPOP data for both countries showed that individuals who are more disaffected 
participate less, but the national aggregate levels of disaffection and participation contradict the standing theories 
in a country-level comparison. 
 2 
Structure of the Paper 
This paper will begin with an overview of the methodology used for this comparative 
study: an explanation of how the quantitative analyses were produced, the strategies for the 
qualitative field work, and how the proposed hypotheses will be tested.   Chapter three will then 
establish the comparison - quantitative analyses will illustrate the paradox mentioned above, 
therefore justifying the case selection, and then will use this data comparison to demonstrate the 
explanatory weaknesses of the existing theories on political participation in post-authoritarian 
contexts.  An overview of the background and supporting literature will be provided in chapter 
four, followed by a presentation of the central and sub-hypotheses.  These hypotheses will then 
be tested in chapter five with the selected case studies of Argentina and Chile.  The chapter will 
be broken down into sections that correspond with the test of each sub-hypothesis as well as brief 
section comparing the alternative sub-hypotheses A and B and alternative sub-hypotheses C and 
D.   A summary of the results of the hypothesis testing will follow in chapter six, as well as state 
the implications and applicability of the hypotheses.  
  
 3 
CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY 
This paper will present one central hypothesis and a set of four sub-hypotheses that 
attempt to explain the difference in participation characteristics in Argentina and Chile, 
employing the use of qualitative and historical sources, built on a foundation of a quantitative 
analysis of both disaffection and participation data and existing academic literature and theories. 
As the paradox this study seeks to address is quantitative in nature, a means analysis of 
the data on both political disaffection and participation will be used to, not only establish the 
existence and extent of disaffection in the case studies, but also to illustrate the limited 
applicability of existing theories by comparing the mean levels of disaffection and participation 
in each country.  This quantitative analysis will then be used as the empirical foundation for the 
study as well as justification for the case selection. 
The hypotheses presented will be tested with the case studies of Argentina and Chile, by 
combining data gathered from interviews with historical and academic literature.  The interview 
data was collected through fieldwork conducted by the author on-site in the two countries over a 
ten week period.  The structure of the interviews was open and informal and participants were 
selected by the snowball method, expanding from existing contacts.  For interview question 
guidelines, see Appendices B and C.  Those interviewed included citizens, academics, and a 
smaller proportion of politicians, all of whom participated in accordance with the Internal 
Review Board protocols.  For notes taken from the interviews, see Appendices D and E.  As 
much of the literature on the topic of post-authoritarian political participation has been 
institutionally-based, fieldwork was necessary in order to identify and explain the perceptional 
opportunity structures for political participation and the contributions from those interviewed 
 4 
help to give the argument a balance between the “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches of 
analysis.   
Whether or not the hypotheses explain political participation in the Argentine and 
Chilean post-authoritarian regimes will depend on whether they are accepted or rejected in this 
qualitative and historically-based test of the case studies.   
  
 5 
CHAPTER THREE: ESTABLISHING THE COMPARISON 
Political Disaffection in Chile and Argentina 
In order to frame the comparison between Chile and Argentina, it is helpful to first place 
the two countries‟ levels of disaffection within the regional context.  According to the 
established definition of political disaffection, both long-term and short-term perceptions and 
opinions towards governments and the democratic regime combine, creating “the subjective 
feeling of powerlessness, cynicism, and lack of confidence in the political process, politicians, 
and democratic institutions, but with no questioning of the democratic regime” also known as 
„political disaffection‟ (Torcal and Montero 2006, p6).  This condition, common among citizens 
in both established and newer democracies, is not to be confused with support for democracy, 
which scholars have proved is relatively stable, but rather consists of discontent with 
governments‟ performance and the functioning of political institutions in general during the 
democratic period.
3
   
In general, when compared with the rest of Latin America, Argentina and Chile represent 
the opposite ends of the spectrum for the characteristics of political disaffection – Chile having 
one of the least disaffected citizenries and Argentina having one of the most disaffected.  A 
central characteristic of political disaffection is a relatively low degree of confidence and trust in 
political institutions, such as elections and political parties.  Chileans show higher opinions of 
such institutions.  According to the Latin American Public Opinion Poll, the average trust in 
political parties in Chile is 41.0%, compared with 31.4% in Argentina, ranking them 2
nd
 and 13
th
 
                                                          
3
 See Gunther and Montero, Torcal, and Torcal and Lago in Political Disaffection in Contemporary Democracies, 
2006.  
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Latin American countries.
4
  When asked to what extent they trusted elections, 61.0% of 
Chileans responded that they had confidence in elections, the 3
rd
 highest level in Latin America.  
Average trust in elections is 44.9% in Argentina, ranking them as 16
th
 out of 19, showing more 
confidence than only three countries: Peru, Honduras, and Paraguay.  Another important aspect 
of political disaffection is the opinion that politicians and political parties do not represent their 
voters.  Here as well, citizens in Argentina show much more disaffection than in Chile.  When 
looking at the average trust that political parties represent their voters, Chile is ranked as 6
th
 
highest in the region with an average agreement of 43.5% while the average of 34.9% for 
Argentina, ranks it as 12
th
 in the region.  A more drastic comparison between the two is the 
average belief that political parties listen to the people, where the average response in Chile was 
38.6% and a regional ranking of 2
nd
, while the average in Argentina was 31.1%, ranking them as 
12
th
 of 19 in the region (For data tables, graphics, and citations, see Appendix A).  
In a more in-depth comparative analysis of political disaffection, the data clearly shows 
that citizens in Argentina have less respect for the political system, lower confidence in political 
institutions, and believe that politicians and parties represent and listen to the people less than 
citizens in Chile.  In addition, for most questions the mean response regarding these areas 
decreased slightly or remained the same from 2008 to 2010 in Argentina compared to a slight 
increase or no change for the same questions in Chile, therefore establishing the fact that at least 
recently, the level of political disaffection in these two countries has remained relatively stable, 
and what little change there has been only confirms Chilean citizens as not very disaffected and 
Argentine citizens as more disaffected.  
                                                          
4
 From AmericasBarometro Insights Series, 2008 (2). 
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The following tables represent the average response of citizens in both Chile and 
Argentina to questions regarding their opinions of the political system in their country.  
Responses were given on a scale of 1-8, where 1 represents “none”, and 8 represents “a lot”.  
Data taken from the Latin American Public Opinion Polls, Vanderbilt University, Chile 2008, 
2010; Argentina 2008, 2010. 
Table 1: Opinion of Political System  
Question Year Chile Argentina 
To what extent do you respect political institutions 
in your country? 
2008 4.67 4.23 
N = 1487 
St. Dev = 1.75 
N = 1416 
St. Dev = 1.84  
2010 4.77 4.07 
N = 1309 
St. Dev = 1.63 
N = 1352 
St. Dev = 1.97  
To what extent do you believe that citizens‟ basic 
human rights are well protected by your country‟s 
political system? 
2008 4.09 3.34 
N = 1486 
St. Dev =1.57 
N = 1410 
St. Dev = 1.57 
2010 4.31 3.36 
N = 1887 
St. Dev = 1.58 
N = 1334 
St. Dev = 1.70 
To what extent do you feel proud to live under 
your country‟s political system? 
2008 4.29 3.76 
N = 1487 
St. Dev = 1.68 
N = 1415 
St. Dev = 1.83 
2010 4.52 3.63 
N = 1892 
St. Dev = 1.59 
N = 1327 
St. Dev = 1.94 
To what extent do you believe that one should 
support your country‟s political system? 
2008 4.38 4.18 
N = 1484 
St. Dev = 1.73 
N = 1385 
St. Dev = 1.86 
2010 4.69 4.02 
N = 1871 
St. Dev = 1.62 
N = 1323 
St. Dev = 2.06 
Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project Online Database. Chile 2008, 2010; Argentina 2008, 2010. 
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 As can be seen from Table 1, Argentine citizens have lower opinions of the political 
system as a whole than Chileans.  In every question and for both years, the average response for 
Argentineans was lower, and in all but one question the response lowered from 2008 to 2010, 
whereas in Chile the average response increased, although not dramatically. 
 
Table 2: Confidence in Institutions 
Question Year Chile Argentina 
To what extent do you have confidence in the 
judicial system? 
2008 3.75 3.21 
N = 1501 
St. Dev = 1.69 
N = 1445 
St. Dev = 1.54 
2010 3.89 3.19 
N = 1929 
St. Dev = 1.74  
N = 1368 
St. Dev = 1.70 
To what extent do you have confidence in the 
national Congress/Parliament? 
2008 4.03 3.24 
N = 1478 
St. Dev = 1.63 
N = 1388 
St. Dev = 1.59 
2010 4.21 3.29 
N = 1896 
St. Dev = 1.64 
N = 1338 
St. Dev = 1.73 
To what extent do you have confidence in the 
national government? 
2008 4.48 3.63 
N = 1507 
St. Dev = 1.64 
N = 1431 
St. Dev = 1.71 
2010 4.74 3.16 
N = 1904 
St. Dev = 1.60 
N = 1386 
St. Dev = 1.80 
To what extent do you have confidence in the 
President? 
2008 4.68 3.75 
N = 1495 
St. Dev = 1.75 
N = 1426 
St. Dev = 1.80 
2010 4.68 2.98 
N = 1911 
St. Dev = 1.78 
N = 1392 
St. Dev = 1.81 
To what extent do you have confidence in the 
political parties? 
2008 3.46 2.89 
N = 1486 
St. Dev = 1.70 
N = 1439 
St. Dev = 1.57 
2010 3.30 2.64 
N = 1910 
St. Dev = 1.81 
N = 1380 
St. Dev = 1.62 
 9 
To what extent do you have confidence in your 
municipal government? 
2008 4.57 3.73 
N = 1502 
St. Dev = 1.60 
N = 1411 
St. Dev = 1.63 
2010 4.56 3.40 
N = 1919 
St. Dev = 1.65 
N = 1356 
St. Dev = 1.81 
To what extent do you have confidence in elections? 2008 4.64 3.69 
N = 1487 
St. Dev = 1.65 
N = 1429 
St. Dev = 1.69 
2010 5.10 3.52 
N = 1915 
St. Dev = 1.53 
N = 1366 
St. Dev = 1.91 
Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project Online Database. Chile 2008, 2010; Argentina 2008, 2010. 
 
From the data presented in Table 2, one can clearly see that the levels of confidence in all 
political institutions are lower in Argentina than they are in Chile.  In addition, the average 
response of Argentineans dropped in all but one question in comparison to the general increase, 
although not severe, from 2008 to 2010 in the average response of Chilean citizens.  Two points 
of particular interest are that 1) in both countries, the lowest level of trust is towards political 
parties; and 2) one of the greatest differences in confidence levels is that of confidence in 
elections, where the average response of Argentineans was almost one full point lower than 
Chileans; that increased to a difference of 1.58 in 2010. 
 
Table 3: Beliefs as to Responsiveness 
Question Year Chile Argentina 
Thinking about political parties in general, to what 
extent do the political parties in your country 
represent their voters well? 
2008 3.61 3.09 
N = 1439 
St. Dev = 1.57 
N = 1376 
St. Dev = 1.54 
How much do political parties listen to the people? 2008 3.31 2.87 
N = 1468 
St. Dev = 1.59 
N = 1417 
St. Dev = 1.51 
To what extent does the national 
Congress/Parliament complete what you expect? 
2008 3.73 3.02 
N = 1435 N = 1320 
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St. Dev = 1.49 St. Dev = 1.53 
Those who govern the country are interested in 
what people like me think.  To what extent do you 
agree or disagree? 
2008 3.62 2.91 
N = 1478 
St. Dev = 1.81 
N = 1387 
St. Dev = 1.73 
2010 3.71 2.91 
N = 1903 
St. Dev = 1.91 
N = 1367 
St. Dev = 1.92 
Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project Online Database. Chile 2008, 2010; Argentina 2008, 2010. 
 
 
Analyzing Political Participation in Chile and Argentina and Weaknesses of Existing 
Theories 
 
This portion of this comparative study attempts to understand the compared levels of 
current political participation in Argentina and Chile through the analysis of public opinion poll 
data.
5
  For the purposes of this paper, the data results were selected and grouped based on four 
categories of political participation according to the typology put forth by Teorell, Torcal, and 
Montero (2007): voting, contacting, involvement in party activities, and participation in public 
manifestations or protests. 
 Through a comparison of mean levels of participation, one can see that most levels of 
participation are higher in Argentina than in Chile.
6
  The data from the voting category will not 
                                                          
5
 Data taken from the online database of the Latin American Public Opinion Project, , Vanderbilt University. Chile 
2006, 2008, 2010; Argentina 2008, 2010. Data for participation in a protest or public demonstration not available for 
Chile for the year 2008.  The data for this question was taken from the LAPOP survey for 2006 for Chile and 2008 
for Argentina.    
6
 Although differences between local-level and national-level participation will be mentioned, the topic is largely 
outside of the scope of this study.  For related works, see works by Paul Posner and Juan Pablo Luna. 
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be given much importance for this study, as the voting systems are different and may therefore 
affect the comparative power of the two systems.
7
   
 
Table 4: Voting Participation 
Voter Turnout (% of VAP)  in Presidential Elections 
 Chile  Argentina 
1999 72.8% 1999 79.4% 
2005 63.6% 2003 76.9% 
2006 63.0% 2007 72.2% 
Source: IDEA online database. 
 
The following tables represent the average response of citizens in both Chile and 
Argentina as to their involvement in various forms of political participation.  The percentages 
represent the frequency of each response. 
 
Table 5: Contacting Participation 
Contacted a Government Official 
  Chile Argentina 
Member of Congress 2008 5.1% 
(n = 1517) 
3.4% 
(n = 1448) 
2010 3.0% 
(n = 1963) 
4.0% 
(n = 1394) 
Local Authority 2008 8.1% 
(n = 1518) 
16.0% 
(n = 1440) 
2010 16.11% 
(n = 1962) 
10.9% 
(n = 1440) 
Minister/Secretary, Public 
Institution, or State Office 
2008 19.6% 
(n = 1518) 
12.6% 
(n = 1447) 
2010 5.8% 
(n = 1961) 
13.0% 
(n = 1395) 
Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project Online Database. Chile 2008, 2010; Argentina 2008, 2010. 
                                                          
7
 In Argentina, both registration and voting are mandatory by law, whereas in Chile, voting is mandatory by law, 
but registration is not, therefore disqualifying the data on voting for this comparative study.  Voter turnout in 
Argentina is relatively low for mandatory voting as those 500 kilometers or more away from their residence are 
excused from voting, and some citizens do not vote, despite the requirement by law (See Appendix D: Interview 
Notes. 
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Table 6: Party Activity Participation 
Participated in Party Activity 
  Chile Argentina 
Worked for a party or candidate 2008 2.6% 
(n = 1492) 
10.1% 
(n = 1452) 
2010 2.9% 
(n = 1950) 
10.6% 
(n = 1387) 
Went to a political party or 
movement meeting 
2008 2.8% 
(n = 1510) 
14.7% 
(n = 1465) 
2010 3.5% 
(n = 1963) 
11.8% 
(n = 1379) 
Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project Online Database. Chile 2008, 2010; Argentina 2008, 2010. 
 
Table 7: Protest Activity
8
 
Participated in a Protest or Public Demonstration 
 Chile Argentina 
2010 3.36% 
(n = 1957) 
15.4% 
(n = 1380) 
Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project Online Database. Chile 2010; Argentina 2010. 
 
While, at first glance, the Argentine data could be applied to Gamson‟s theory of 
participation (1968) that predicts an increase in nonconventional participation when citizens do 
not see traditional mechanisms as effective, comparing the data for nonconventional and 
conventional participation eliminates this hypothesis as an explanation.  If the theory were 
applicable to the Argentine case the relation between the two would be negative, and in this case 
it is positive, confirming part of Torcal and Lago‟s conclusion that an increase in 
nonconventional participation does not necessarily stipulate a decrease in conventional methods 
and in most new democracies the two are in fact positively correlated (2006).   Although this part 
                                                          
8
 It would be useful to have a temporal comparison, but the remaining data sets are not comparable.  For Chile in 
2006, only 21.1% of respondents said that they had ever participated in a protest in their life; of that 21.1%, 28.9% 
said that they had participated in a protest in the last year, suggesting that only 6.10% of respondents had 
participated in a protest in the last year.  In 2008, the data for Argentina show that 27.2% of respondents had 
participated in a protest in the last year. (Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project Online Database, Chile 
2006 and Argentina 2008). 
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of their theory is applicable to the Argentine-Chilean comparison, other elements of the cases 
contradict their conclusions.  They argue that higher levels of disaffection are correlated with 
lower levels of both conventional and nonconventional participation, which holds true when 
examining the responses of individuals, but not when looking at the national comparisons for 
Chile and Argentina.  While the levels of participation are not always higher in Argentina, as in 
Chile two types of contacting were more prevalent in 2008 and contacting at the local level was 
higher in 2010, the levels are similar and overall higher in Argentina, but according to Torcal and 
Lago, there should be consistently higher participation in Chile, both conventional and 
nonconventional.  Therefore, while attitudinal theories may help explain individuals‟ 
participation, it cannot be applied to the broader comparison of these two countries.   
Theories maintaining that the nature of the authoritarian regime in terms of the scope and 
intensity of repression directed towards citizens leads to lower levels of participation are also 
unsatisfactory for explaining the cases of Argentina and Chile.
9
  The repression enacted by the 
military regime in Argentina affected many more people and was wider in scope, as it was 
directed towards the younger and intellectual populations in general, whereas repression during 
the dictatorship in Chile was more targeted towards individuals that spoke out against the 
government or specific minority groups.  The fact that there is currently more participation in 
Argentina, despite higher levels of repression during the authoritarian regime, eliminates this 
theory‟s explanatory power. 
                                                          
9
 See, for example, Remmer, 1989. 
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Some scholars have argued that a stronger democratic history leads to better prospects for 
the consolidation of democracy in post-authoritarian regimes, often citing Chile as an example.
10
  
For example, Angell‟s examination of the democratic regime in Chile is more successful as a 
result of the democratic stability before 1973, and that many political institutions and norms 
were carried through the dictatorship, facilitating the establishment of the new democratic 
regime.  He notes the claims of voter participation and party system decline due to 
unresponsiveness and elitism, but argues that although “signs of political „desencanto‟ or 
„desgaste‟ may be shown by the public opinion polls... the electoral evidence shows less 
evidence of any serious disenchantment” (2010, p279).  His argument therefore does not give 
much weight to the decline in voter turnout as well as ignores the other aspects of participation.  
This line of thought, when looking at the ramifications for participation in the democratic 
regime, is not supported by the cases of Argentina and Chile in many aspects.  The history of 
democracy is overall much stronger in Chile than in Argentina.  Chile enjoyed stable democratic 
governance from 1945 until 1973, when General Augusto Pinochet‟s military regime came to 
power through a coup that prematurely ended the term of the first democratically elected socialist 
president in Latin America, Salvador Allende.  Allende, representing the popular sector of a 
drastically divided society, became wildly unpopular with the middle and upper classes because 
of his administration‟s redistributive socialist policies and the increasing power of trade unions 
to halt the country‟s economy by mobilization tactics.  As such, the military coup was supported 
by a significant portion of the population, with its main support base consisting in the middle and 
upper classes.  Although Pinochet‟s period of rule was a break from the historical pattern, Chile 
has the most consistent tradition of democracy in Latin America.  Argentina‟s history, on the 
                                                          
10
 See, for example, Mainwaring and Hagopian 2005; and Angell, “Democratic Governance in Chile” in Democratic 
Governance in Latin America eds Mainwaring and Scully, 2010. 
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other hand, consists of a long period of Perón‟s populist dictatorship, the continuance of populist 
and clientalistic traditions, and unstable and volatile political institutions.  Therefore, according 
to theories relating to democratic history, Chile should have a higher level of participation, which 
is not the case.  Even conventional participation is not always higher than the Argentine levels, 
as contacting is higher in some levels and some years in Argentina (see Table 5). 
Various explanations have traditionally been employed in explaining post-authoritarian 
participation, most stemming from factors that were altered to a great extent during the 
authoritarian period, namely the influence of trade unions, repression against protestors, the 
electoral system/process, and the economic system.  As these factors and their effects on citizen 
participation, in the Argentine and Chilean cases, can be explained by the extent to which they 
were changed during the authoritarian period and, even more so by whether or not the 
authoritarian regime was able to impose policies that controlled these factors into the democratic 
era, which was a concrete characteristic of the type of transition.  In Argentina, the military 
regime was not strong enough to completely dismantle the trade unions, and was so weak at the 
time of transition that it was unable to diminish the unions‟ power, reform the electoral system, 
or implement any other policies that would have an influence in the decision-making of the 
democratic regime or the characteristics of the democratic system.  In Chile, on the other hand, 
the authoritarian regime remained strong in comparison to their opposition, and was able to 
formally change the electoral system, keep the trade unions dismantled, and set up the continuity 
of economic policy.  Any explanations that focus solely on these aspects are therefore too limited 
in their scope, as such factors are clearly determined by the nature of the transition to democracy. 
Theories dealing with the electoral system specifically are lacking in a number of ways 
when looking at these two cases.  The Argentine electoral system is more proportional than the 
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Chilean system, as determined by the Lijphart Index of Disproportionality.  Between the years 
1980-1991, the score for Argentina is 6.26, whereas 5.80 corresponds with the Chilean system.  
This is largely due to the general characteristics of the electoral systems: both are presidential, 
bicameral systems with similar average district magnitudes in the upper houses; however, 
Argentina has a magnitude of 6.24 in the lower house, compared to 2 in the Chilean lower house 
and has lower average assembly sizes than those in Argentina, which accounts for the difference 
in disproportionality.
 11
  According to the majority of the literature on the effects of electoral 
systems on voter turnout (see, for example, Powell and Crewe 1981, Jackman 1987, and Franklin 
1996), one should expect a system with greater disproportionality to have lower participation; 
scholars argue that the greater the disproportionality, the more unfair the system, resulting in 
voter alienation and disinclination to vote and that elections are less competitive and therefore 
produce less incentive to vote.  Previous studies on electoral systems also theorize that more 
proportional systems have an increased number of political parties, increasing the number of 
options available to voters and further motivating them to participate (Blais and Carty 1990, 
Blais 2000).   
When examining these cases, the lower disproportionality in the Argentine electoral 
system would suggest that it would foster more representational-based participation than in 
Chile; this is not the case, as seen from the generally higher levels of contacting in Chile and its 
comparable voting levels to Argentina.  Electoral system explanations are also contradicted in 
this comparison as one should expect a higher number of parties in Argentina, which is not so.  
There are currently two parties (although fracturing, weak, and poorly organized) in Argentina, 
                                                          
11
 Average assembly sizes are: 46.5 in the upper house and 255 in the lower house in Argentina; 38 in the upper 
house and 120 in the lower house in Chile.  Information on electoral systems taken from “A Guide to the Electoral 
Systems of the Americas” Mark P. Jones, 1995; and “Neoinstitutional accounts of voter turnout: moving beyond 
industrial democracies” Aníbal Pérez Liñán, 2001. 
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whereas there are five distinct parties (although they organize in coalition-form) in Chile.  
Theories based solely on an examination of the electoral system are clearly inadequate for 
explaining Argentine and Chilean representative-based participation, but also ignores a variety of 
other important factors, such as the functioning of other political institutions (such as political 
parties) and limitations on, and socialization of various types of participation.  
While it does not exclusively examine political participation, Frances Hagopian‟s review 
essay on the authoritarian legacies literature provides a useful backdrop to the following case 
examinations.  Criticizing one of the conventional views that authoritarian regimes “freeze” 
party systems and do not allow for the emergence of political alternatives
12
, Hagopian argues 
that more attention should be given to the details of the actions taken by the authoritarian 
regimes in limiting the political arena: “authoritarian legacies have been molded by the effects of 
the policies pursued by authoritarian regimes on the ways in which political interests before 
military rule were organized and mediated... It was not merely the scale of repression of military 
regimes nor whether they permitted political mobilization that influenced political change... 
rather, political change was a function of which avenues of political mediation they left open and 
which they shut” (1993, pp488-491).  To support her argument, she cites various scholars on the 
post-authoritarian political culture in Brazil who note the importance of examining the role of the 
dictatorship and the events following it.  Francisco Weffort‟s essay “Why Democracy”, for 
example, argues that the political culture in Brazil remained highly statist despite high levels of 
transition-era mobilization, making the case that the “political tradition molded by the oligarchs 
and the dictatorships is still with us” (1989, p334).  Maria do Carmo Campello de Souza also 
                                                          
12
 Hagopian cites, for example, Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan. 1967. “Cleavage Structures, Party 
Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction” in Lipset and Rokkan, eds. Party Systems and Voter Alignments: 
Cross National Perspectives. Free Press: New York.  
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questioned the assumed new strength of civil society in Brazil, claiming that those groups that 
were mobilized during the transition were subsequently demobilized by later democratic 
governments (1989).  It is in this vein that the following hypotheses are presented and tested; that 
there were tendencies and characteristics in the political system and culture pre-dating the 
authoritarian regimes, but that these traits were transformed and their practices limited to varying 
extents during the dictatorships, therefore altering the path that political participation would take 
in the future.  While the nature of the transition to democracy is part of the explanation for 
current participation, it is not enough and the factors that affected participation during the 
democratic regime must also be examined.  
 This study does not attempt to create a model for the entire phenomenon of participation 
in Argentina and Chile, but rather attempts to create a model that will facilitate in finding 
explanations for the differences in type and quantity of contemporary participation levels that is 
unexplained by and contradicts existing theories.  As such, macro-variables, such as the 
stratification of society, the existence or not of a populist tradition, normative conceptions of the 
roles and rights of citizenship, etc. and the theories on participation that examine them, are not 
discredited in their potential causal power when examining the entire phenomenon.  The purpose 
of this comparative study is to suggest that there are more concrete structures that funnel these 
predispositions towards participation into their actual practiced forms.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE ARGUMENT 
Theoretical Foundations 
The key foundation to this study is an understanding of the types of transitions to 
democracy and the differences between the processes, depending on the nature of the transition.  
Based on the work by Samuel Huntington (1991), there are three general types of transitions to 
democracy: 1) a transformation; and 2) a replacement and 3) a transplacement.  Chile represents 
a case of transformation, whereas Argentina is clearly characterized as a replacement.   
In the Chilean transition, “those in power in the authoritarian regime [took] the lead and 
play[ed] the decisive role in ending that regime and changing it into a democratic system” 
(Huntington 1991, p124).  At least at the beginning of the process, Pinochet‟s opposition was 
significantly weaker than the military regime, and, in an attempt at regaining their faltering 
legitimacy, the authoritarian leaders called elections with an overestimated confidence that they 
would win.  “In Chile General Pinochet created the regime, remained in power for seventeen 
years, established a lengthy schedule for the transition to democracy, implemented that schedule 
in anticipation that the voters would extend him in office for eight more years, and exited 
grudgingly from power when they did not” (Huntington 1991,130).    
Argentina, as an example of a transition by replacement, was characterized by an absence 
of democratic reformers in the authoritarian regime, its increasing debility in relation to its 
opposition, and its eventual collapse and replacement by a democratic regime.  Following the 
government‟s delegitimization, the military regime struggled to hold onto power longer than they 
were functionally capable of doing, in an attempt to negotiate terms for the transition.  This was 
largely a result of the absence of democratic reformers within the regime, or O‟Donnell and 
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Schmitter‟s concept of “soft-liners”, which will be examined shortly.  Consequently, the 
government collapsed and its leaders were excluded from the transition process. 
“In December 1982... mounting public opposition and the development of 
opposition organizations led to mass protests, a general strike, Bigone‟s 
scheduling of elections, and the rejection by the united opposition parties of the 
terms proposed by the military for the transfer of power.  The authority of the 
lame-duck military regime continued to deteriorate until it was replaced by the 
Alfonsín government elected in October 1983” (Huntington 1991, 143).   
 
O‟Donnell and Schmitter provide a variety of concepts and conclusions that are 
indispensible in examining the different dynamics of transitions.  To begin, they claim that there 
are several factors that determine the transition type: the relative strengths of the authoritarian 
regime and the opposition, the self-confidence of the incumbent regime, and whether the 
incumbent regime was dominated by „soft-liners‟ or „hard-liners‟.  In regards to the power ratio 
between the opposition and the government, they concluded that regimes which were 
unsuccessful in ruling the country stimulated opposition to organize, making them more likely to 
impose the transition upon the government, as was the case in Argentina.  In comparison, a 
regime that was fairly successful generally did not encounter an opposition with a greater relative 
strength and therefore opted for a transition with more self-confidence, resulting in a greater 
degree of control over the process.    
“The regime-confident, self-initiated scenario differs from the opposition-induced 
one in two key respects: (1) the sequence, rhythm, and scope of liberalization and 
democratization tend to remain more firmly in the control of the incumbents...; 
and (2) the social and political forces which supported the authoritarian regime 
stand a better chance of playing a significant electoral an representational role in 
the subsequent regime” (O‟Donnell and Schmitter 1986, p21).   
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The authors also note that “the extreme fear of the “chaos” which preceded authoritarian 
rule” plays an important role during the transition and often long into democratic consolidation 
by making society more hostile to citizen political participation and sustains the perceived threat 
of another attempted and successful coup.  Argentine society experienced more “chaos” during 
the military regime than before it, which, combined with the internal fragmentation and 
weakness of the regime, diminished any fear of this sort.  In contrast, this fear was very present 
in Chile, as the coup in 1973 was in response to chaos, especially in regards to political 
participation, and, together with the relative success of the authoritarian regime, created an 
extensive fear of renewed conflict and another coup should the transition process falter.  
The presence and interaction of different factions within the authoritarian regime also 
influences the course of the process, with different effects depending on the context.  “There is 
no transition whose beginning is not the consequence – direct or indirect – of important divisions 
within the authoritarian regime itself, principally along the fluctuating cleavage between hard-
liners and soft-liners” (O‟Donnell and Schmitter 1986, p19).  In Chile, decisions regarding the 
transition were made by the „hard-liner‟ top leaders of the authoritarian regime, especially 
General Pinochet, with little weight given to the disorganized and weak opposition they 
encountered in the initial phases.    The leadership of the authoritarian regime in Argentina was 
also dominated by „hard-liners‟ when it began to encounter troubles in the 1970s, but their 
decision to cling to power combined with the government‟s poor performance led to the 
increasing strength of civilian opposition and the collapse of the regime in 1982.   
“Not just opponents but most of those within the regime concluded that the 
experience of authoritarian rule was a resounding failure even according to the 
standards the regime itself had established.  Opponents were stimulated to act 
because the failure was so obvious.  Ruling groups, including the armed forces, 
were less and less confident of their own capacities, as well as deeply fragmented 
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by recriminations over who was responsible for the regime‟s failures” (O‟Donnell 
and Schmitter 1986, 20).  
 
In line with their conclusions, Pinochet‟s regime remained dominated by „hard-liners‟, 
which, combined with its reasonably high levels of popularity and successful governance, 
inhibited the formation of a strong opposition until 1989 and achieved the extensive 
depoliticization of civil society and public space.  “By trivializing citizenship and repressing 
political identities, authoritarian rule destroys self-organized and autonomously defined political 
spaces and substitutes for them a state-controlled public arena in which any discussion of issues 
must be made in codes and terms established by the rules...” (O‟Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 
p48).   While there were some exceptions, such as the student mobilizations that undoubtedly 
helped to delegitimize the regime, the general citizenry did not push the boundaries of the 
political arenas defined by the Pinochet regime, largely due to the fear of the secret police and 
the expectation of repression for collectively organizing.
13
 
In contrast, the unsuccessful and unpopular Argentine authoritarian regime was met by an 
opposition that would eventually consist of almost the entire citizenry.  Because political parties 
in Argentina had originally entered negotiations with the military and were not strong to begin 
with, civil society organizations initially acted as the military‟s opponent and managed to 
mobilize mass amounts of citizens which the regime was no longer capable to repress.   
“The catalyst in this transformation comes first from gestures by exemplary 
individuals, who begin testing the boundaries of behavior initially imposed by the 
incumbent regime... These individual gestures are astonishingly successful in 
provoking or reviving collective identities and actions; they, in turn, help forge 
broad identifications which embody the explosion of a highly repoliticized and 
angry society” (O‟Donnell and Schmitter 1986, p49). 
                                                          
13
 See Appendix E: Interview Notes - Chile. 
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This transformation can clearly be seen in the Argentine case, where a couple of civil 
society organizations, most notably the “Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo”, began to push the 
opening of public spaces by making claims regarding human rights.  The internal and external 
support they received helped to delegitimize the military regime and united the citizenry in a 
collective identity against the incumbent government.  This phenomenon will be explored in 
more detail in the testing of sub-hypothesis B. 
The role and effects of citizen mobilization before and during transitions to democracy 
has been a topic of debate amongst scholars in the past decades.  The classic line of thought 
maintained that elite negotiation and acceptance of the “rules of the game” were imperative to 
smooth the process of transition, lessen political confrontation and often minimize political 
violence
14
, however a new school of thought has emerged that makes the case for the 
examination of the nature and actions of other actors in transitioning systems.  These academics 
have come to agree that citizen involvement, especially in the form of mobilization, plays an 
important role in the breakdown of an authoritarian regime and/or the transition to and 
consolidation of democracy.   One such example is Valerie Bunce‟s examination of transitions to 
democracy in post-communist countries, where she noted that mass mobilizations:  
“...Signaled the breakdown of the authoritarian order; created a widespread sense 
that there were alternatives to that order; pushed authoritarian leaders... to the 
bargaining table; created (and sometimes restored) a large opposition united by its 
rejection of the incumbent regime; and gave opposition leaders a resource 
advantage when bargaining with authoritarian elites.  Finally, mass mobilization 
created a mandate that demanded radical change that subsequently translated into 
a large victory for the democratic forces...” (Bunce 2003, p172). 
                                                          
14
 See, for example, Cavarozzi, in Higley and Gunther, eds., Elites and Democratic Consoli dation in Latin America 
and Southern Europe, 1992; O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, 1986; and Linz and Stepan Problems of 
Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, 1996. 
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 Similarly, Sidney Tarrow argued that the determinants of democracy are not objective, 
but rather processes of choice and perception.  “If a new democracy is to be generated, someone 
must transform structural factors into action through political choice...” (1995, p207).  Amongst 
Tarrow‟s many works on social movements and mobilization, the framework he provides for the 
analysis of opportunity structures is especially useful in understanding citizen participation in the 
political systems of Chile and Argentina both during and following the transition to democracy.  
While many other political science and social movement scholars have built alternative 
definitions of „opportunity structure‟, stressing that structural openings and changes are what 
actually determines the capacity for actors to mobilize, it is Tarrow‟s definition that will be used 
for this analysis, as the signals of opportunities and perceptions of citizens is considered essential 
in understanding the opportunity structures in the following cases.   
Meyer and Minkoff‟s summary of the „signals model‟ states that “the logic of this model 
is that activists and officials monitor changes in the political environment, looking for 
encouragement for mobilization and for advocating policy reforms.  The model includes issue-
specific and general opportunity variables that savvy activist entrepreneurs could read as 
invitations to mobilize” (2004, p1470).  In his examination of democratization efforts in Spain 
and Italy, Tarrow maintained that mobilization pressured elites to move towards democracy and 
the result of the interactions between various actors during the transition process affected the 
nature and consolidation of the emerging democratic system.  
 “Let us begin by assuming that every democratic episode, whether successful or 
not, can be seen as a cycle of mobilization and strategic interaction, in which 
actors at both the elite and mass levels take advantage of new and expanded 
opportunities in both political and civil society.  Opportunities not only present 
themselves exogenously... but also endogenously, in response to actions taken by 
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other actors in the system – elite and mass, institutional and extrainstitutional” 
(Tarrow 1995, p208-209). 
 
It is on the original premises of Tarrow‟s signals model of opportunity structures that the 
framework for this study is based, but the effects of an opportunity structure on participation is 
not limited to mobilization, as the model has traditionally been used.
15
  Instead, the concept of 
opportunity structure will be applied to all methods of participation, with more focus placed on 
opportunities for conventional and nonconventional methods.  While structural elements 
(referred to here as institutional factors) are considered real and having a significant impact on 
the types of participation that are available to citizens, it is the argument of this analysis that the 
perceptions and risk-analysis of individuals in relation to these structures is what brings about 
their choice to participate in a certain way and not in others.  Institutional factors may include, 
but are not limited to, manipulation of political institutions during and after the transition to 
democracy such as the framing of a new constitution with „authoritarian legacies‟ before handing 
power over to a democratic government, and repression in response to certain forms of 
participation.   
Although the institutional „authoritarian legacies‟ have been long-studied by scholars, the 
perceptions of citizens as to the opportunities for participation should be given due attention as 
well, especially when examining a controlled-transition case, such as Chile.  Factors must be 
taken into account such as public support for the authoritarian regime, the perceived strength of 
the regime, and from that perception, the consequences or benefits citizens expect by engaging in 
various forms of participation.  These dynamics make up the first four tiers of the model of the 
central hypothesis.  The remaining three are the post-transition processes of political 
                                                          
15
 See Tarrow, 1994, 1995. 
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socialization combined with the contemporary institutional framework that establishes the 
current opportunity structure and subsequent citizen political participation.   
The concept of political socialization is taken from works on contentious repertoires (see 
Tilly 1995, and Tarrow 1995) and expanded to include all forms of participation available 
through the corresponding opportunity structures.  Following the definitions provided by Tilly, it 
is assumed that contentious repertoires, or “the established ways in which actors make and 
receive claims bearing on each other‟s interests...” are a “limited set of routines that are learned, 
shared, and acted out through a relatively deliberate process of choice... [They are] learned 
cultural creations, but they do not descend from abstract philosophy or take shape as a result of 
political propaganda; they emerge from struggle” (1995, p29).  As will be examined in the case 
studies to follow, the development of contentious repertoires in post-authoritarian Argentina and 
Chile had much to do with the interpretation of signals from the regime, the institutional reality 
of those signals, and the cost-benefit analysis of various types of participation. In the Argentine 
case, it was clear to citizens, opposition parties, and the incumbent government itself that the 
authoritarian regime was collapsing and that they were disappearing as an actor in the transition 
process.  This gave civil society more confidence to participate in a variety of ways; it gave the 
opposition more confidence to deny the incumbent regime‟s feeble attempts at claims-making, 
and resulted in a low self-confidence level for the military government.  In Chile this was not the 
case – as a controlled transition, the military regime entered the process with more self-
confidence and both civilians and the opposition parties were less capable and less willing to 
organize outside of the electoral arena designated by Pinochet.   
The hypotheses for this comparative study do not question these established theories on 
the role of citizen mobilization in transitions to democracy, nor explores in-depth the reasons 
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behind it; rather they predict that citizen participation during the transitions to democracy is 
conditioned by opportunity structures comprised of both institutional and perceptional factors, 
and that the characteristics of the structure of opportunities is ultimately decided by the nature of 
the transition process.  The following hypotheses follow the logical path that if an authoritarian 
regime is strong compared to its opposition, it will set the terms for and pace of the transition to 
democracy resulting in a transformation transition, which will limit how political participation is 
developed by narrowing the structure of opportunities, both institutional and perceived by 
citizens.  Conversely, if an authoritarian regime is overall weaker than its opposition, a 
replacement transition will ensue, which will create broader opportunity structures that will 
result in more overall political participation. 
 
Central Hypothesis: The type of transition to democracy, either controlled or by regime 
collapse, ultimately produces the nature of contemporary and future citizen participation 
 This hypothesis predicts the causal pathways that explain the difference in current 
participation levels in Argentina and Chile.  It predicts that the type of transition, as a result of 
the strength of both the authoritarian regime, in functional institutional capacity and popular 
support, and the relative strength of the democratic opposition, determines both the institutional 
opportunity structure for participation and the opportunity structure perceived by citizens.  The 
combination of these two factors affects what kind and how much participation occurs during the 
transition.  It is predicted that when tested with case-studies, the controlled transition will create 
more restricted institutional and perceived opportunity structures, resulting in less diverse 
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participation, whereas a replacement transition, where the incumbent regime collapses, will 
result in more open opportunity structures, producing a broader range of participation types.  
  As a result of participation during the transition and the assessment of it, citizens 
undergo a process of socialization where certain forms of civilian involvement, as well as the 
ways in which people think about the legitimacy and role of certain methods in shaping the 
political system, begin to create a repertoire of participation that evolves and adapts during the 
democratic regime.  The collective experience of repertoire formation then interacts with the 
perceptions of citizens and current political institutions to create the present opportunity structure 
of participation.  It is through this second opportunity structure, as a result of the various factors 
in this causal chain that one can accurately account for the distinct characteristics of current 
participation in the two case studies. 
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Figure 1: Model of Central Hypothesis 
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these two periods and each period is presented by two sets of alternative sub-hypotheses which 
will be represented by one of the case studies.  
 Sub-Hypothesis A: If the authoritarian regime maintains control of the transition, 
citizens will have a more limited opportunity structure for participation 
(Opportunity Structure A). 
 Sub-Hypothesis B: If the authoritarian regime does not have control over the 
transition process, citizens will have a more open opportunity structure for 
participation (Opportunity Structure B). 
 Sub-Hypothesis C: Opportunity Structure A produces a limited repertoire of 
political participation available, familiar to, and therefore used by citizens. 
 Sub-Hypothesis D: Opportunity Structure B produces a broader repertoire of 
political participation available, familiar to, and therefore used by citizens. 
In order to test these hypotheses, this study will build upon the existing literature and the 
analysis of political disaffection and participation levels in both countries examined above with 
an historical and qualitative examination of the institutional structure and perceptions of citizens 
that will either confirm or reject the sub-hypotheses and therefore the central hypothesis. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: TESTING THE HYPOTHESES 
Testing Sub-Hypothesis A with the Chilean Case: As a result of a transformation 
transition, citizens will have a more limited opportunity structure for participation 
(Opportunity Structure A). 
 This sub-hypothesis examines the circumstances of a transformation transition where the 
authoritarian regime maintains control over the terms and pace of the transition to democracy, 
and will be tested through the application of the Chilean case. 
Pinochet‟s government, despite fluctuations in popularity through the years, still 
maintained a strong level of support at the time of transition due to its successful economic 
policies, control of order, and the continued promise to prevent the return of „the radical left‟.  
This continued support combined with the level of influence he maintained over the armed forces 
and the political elite, allowed Pinochet‟s regime to enter the transition in a relatively powerful 
position where he was able to set the rules for the process, craft a constitution that provided 
privileges to the military that guaranteed them a political role in the future democratic regime, 
and maintain a degree control over the involvement of both political and civilian actors in the 
process that, in turn, affected the ways in which citizens could participate in the changing 
political system. 
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Figure 2: Model of Sub-Hypothesis A as represented by the Chilean context: 
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experience before the 1973 coup, after the plebiscite was organized by the military regime, mass 
mobilization became more of a hindrance than a help to the democratic opposition‟s chances of 
success.   
 “From May 1983 through mid-1986, social mobilizations… formed the core of 
the opposition‟s strategy for securing a transition to democracy…1986 proved 
decisive in demonstrating the futility of the opposition‟s continued reliance on 
mass mobilizations to force the military regime into making concessions on the 
pace and nature of the transition” (Oxhorn 1994, p51). 
 
 Citizen mobilization proved to be an unsuccessful tactic for the opposition, as it only 
strengthened Pinochet‟s popularity – violence produced by the protests ignited a sense of fear in 
society and threatened to justify the continued presence of the military in power, just as the 
violence and chaos that arose during the Allende administration provided justification for the 
coup in 1973.  The quantity and variety of demonstrations was also evidence as to the significant 
divisions within the opposition, who were unable to reach a consensus amongst themselves, and 
therefore unable to provide a viable alternative to Pinochet‟s regime, which gained them little, if 
any, confidence from society.
16
  
Given these inherent complications, the majority of political elites within the opposition 
ultimately accepted the Constitution of 1980 and therefore the plebiscite.  All of the members of 
the coalition agreed, although with much debate, to an electoral strategy – all except the 
Communist Party.  The PC was traditionally the party most involved in protesting and was also 
the party most vehemently against the policies and ideology of the Pinochet regime.  
Subsequently, the Communist Party withdrew from the opposition alliance, boycotted the 
plebiscite, and continued to protest.  In the end, this turned out to be a fatal decision for the party, 
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 See Oxhorn 1994, and Posner 2004. 
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as they were therefore excluded from the elections that proceeded without them and left out of 
any decision-making in the process that proceeded without them.   
Because the opposition agreed to the Constitution, “meant that its only chance to gain 
control of the process lay in the electoral arena… [and that] all important decisions had to be 
made through negotiations among party leaders if the opposition was to succeed” (Oxhorn 1994, 
p56).  The democratic alliance needed to garner enough electoral support to defeat Pinochet, 
which had several implications.  To begin, all resources including finances, time, leadership, and 
so on were directed towards the electoral campaign and registering voters.  This meant that those 
resources would not be put towards any other type of participation, such as mobilization or civil 
society organizations.  Secondly, in order to gain the majority of the population‟s support, 
Pinochet‟s opposition had to present a platform that appealed to the whole nation, which meant 
that individual party activities, including mobilization, risked bringing up issues that the 
members of the alliance did not and were not ready to agree upon, and could either create 
fissures in the coalition, lose the support of certain voters, or both.  Finally, mobilization in the 
past had been accompanied by violence and was one of the reasons that the coup of 1973 had so 
much citizen support.  If the opposition supported collective action and violence, or even if the 
rumor of violence arose, it would cause the coalition to lose voters, or could have been 
justification for Pinochet to call off the elections. 
At its conclusion, the results of the plebiscite handed control of the government over the 
opposition candidate, Patricio Alywin, but the fact that Pinochet received 43% of the vote 
demonstrates the precarious situation in which the opposition found itself when campaigning 
against the General and their need to channel participation into electoral forms and discourage 
mobilization.  The considerable capacity of Pinochet to maintain control over the military and his 
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regime‟s ability to repress any participation outside of their established „rules of the game‟ 
combined with its continued sizable popularity, put the military government in a strong position 
entering the transition – one that allowed them to control the terms for the process, restrict the 
types of interaction between actors, and remain very much present, both institutionally and in the 
minds of the political elite and citizens.  Throughout the transition and until 1998, Pinochet was 
very much present in the institutional framework of the political system, and, as will be explored 
later, has been present in the minds of politicians and citizens for much longer.  Therefore, 
during the transition to democracy and the years following, the fear of both repression and/or the 
return of the military regime to power as well as the institutional limitations for participation 
outside of the major political parties, created a structure of opportunity that produced a primarily 
electorally-limited repertoire of participation for Chilean citizens. 
 
Testing Sub-Hypothesis B with the Argentine Case: If the authoritarian regime does not 
have control over the transition process, citizens will have a more open opportunity 
structure for participation (Opportunity Structure B) 
Argentina has one of the weakest histories of democracy in the region, where a history of 
dictatorships and democratic breakdowns created a political context of polarization, 
confrontation, and often violence.  In Guillermo O‟Donnell‟s landmark piece on the “impossible 
game” of Argentine party democracy in 1955-56, he identified three characteristics of the 
political terrain that made democracy impossible during that period of Argentine history: 1) as 
Peronism was the main party, they would undoubtedly win the elections, but it was assumed that 
its government would rule undemocratically; 2) the Radical Party would never be strong enough 
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to gain majority over the Peronists without restrictions on elections; and 3) the bourgeoisie 
accepted the military as an “umpire of the electoral game”.  The bourgeoisie, before the 1980s, 
never saw the electoral game as the „only game in town‟ – for them, a Peronist victory was seen 
as unacceptable, and therefore preferred military rule over the assumed Peronist government 
(1982).   
This set of relationships defined the “impossible game” for democracy in Argentina until 
the last transition in 1983, when the circumstances changed.  Linz and Stepan identified three 
factors that helped solidify the transition to democracy, or, as the title of the chapter in their book 
says, what changed the political situation in Argentina “from impossible to a possible democratic 
game”.  One of these was the ineffective governance of the military regime, which exposed itself 
as dangerously weak and divided, and therefore lost the confidence and support of the middle 
class.  Secondly, the Radical Party victory in 1983 contradicted the assumption that the Peronists 
would win an unrestricted election.  Finally, the combination of the elections in ‟83 and the 
President Menem‟s (1989-1999) unpopularity further diminished Peronism‟s strength and 
progressively forced the party to respect the “rules of the game”.  “These changes were a 
precondition for developing a possible democratic game” (1996, p196-200). 
The military regime in Argentina was one of the most violent and repressive in Latin 
America, with an estimated 30,000 “disappeared” persons, and many more tortured, but was one 
of the weakest authoritarian regimes at the time of the transition to democracy.  Extremely 
unsuccessful in their performance, politically, economically, and finally with the military defeat 
in Malvinas against the British, there was a low degree of both public-confidence and self-
confidence in the authoritarian regime.  “When confronted with obstacles, the Argentine generals 
seemingly blindly pushed ahead anyway, and in 1982 they launched the disastrous military 
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adventure in the South Atlantic.  Their failure precipitated the sudden collapse of the regime and 
thus led to a new democratic transition” (Cavarozzi 1992, p222).  Having lost any semblance of 
legitimacy and most of their control over the course of the country, citizens began to mobilize, 
initially in the form of civil society organizations and later in non-affiliated groups of civilians, 
to pressure the regime and political parties towards the transition to democracy.  It was therefore 
within the context of the military regime‟s inability to effective maintain governance in the 
country, its delegitimization in the eyes of citizens, and the presence of a strongly united and 
active civil society intent on the reestablishment of democracy and the protection of human 
rights, that Argentina entered into another democratic transition.  
 
Figure 3: Model of Sub-hypothesis B as represented by the Argentine context 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REPLACEMENT 
TRANSITION 
GOVERNMENT COLLAPSE, 
NEW “RULES OF THE GAME”, 
NEW ACTORS 
LITTLE PERCEIVED THREAT 
OF MILITARY REPRESSION 
OR RETURN  
CONVENTIONAL AND NON-
CONVENTIONAL 
PARTICIPATION HIGH DURING 
TRANSITION AND IN EARLY 
YEARS OF DEMOCRACY 
 38 
As political parties were weak and disorganized, citizens and civilian organizations were 
the main force of opposition against the military government.  The first of those to emerge were 
issue-specific social organizations that generally had a political undertone to their demands.  
“Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo” is probably the most famous example.  Organizations of this 
nature helped to delegitimize the authoritarian regime with human rights critiques that eventually 
translated into claims for social and political rights, concluding in the demand for democracy.  
The pro-democracy movement these groups started gained extensive support and eventually 
served as the government‟s primary opposition.  “After years of arbitrary rule, police brutality, 
and despotic treatment in so many social contexts – in other words, after years of deprivation of 
the basic attributes of citizenship – many demand and rejoice in liberalization.... Many discover 
that they, too, have been victims of the regime‟s repression.  Thus, the rage of many who shortly 
before seemed to support the rulers‟ illusion of enjoying a “tacit consensus” becomes 
understandable” (O‟Donnell and Schmitter 1986, p52).  The comparatively large presence of 
collective action can partially be explained by the situational context – that Argentine citizens 
were able to mobilize against the regime because the military government was weak and unable 
to maintain control of the political arena, but in addition, the nature of the movements allowed 
them to gather a massive amount of support while also presenting legitimate claims to which the 
government was not prepared to respond.  As Cheresky explained, mobilization during the 
transition: 
“no se trataba de un movimiento que aspiraba al poder ni organizara una 
oposición violenta que confrontara a los gobernantes militares en términos de 
poder, sino de una resistencia cívica que desbordaba al régimen por su reclamo de 
derechos básicos y de juridicidad, sin pretender constituirse en una alternativa al 
régimen político... Descalificó la prédica de la violencia como modo de reclamo y 
vía para el progreso social...Se bosquejó con los derechos humanos la experiencia 
de un núcleo de sentido independiente del poder, lo cual hizo posible el desarrollo 
de un espacio público de deliberación para la sociedad.  Esto iba bastante más allá 
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de la protesta contra el régimen militar, y contenía una promesa de innovación 
política para el futuro” (2008, p106).17  
 
The first democratic elections in Argentina, free of interference from military regime 
which was too weak to set the terms of the transition, allowed the two major political parties – 
the Radical Party and the Peronist Party, to run against each other and gave a truly democratic 
experience to the people.  The opportunity structure of participation in Argentina therefore made 
all forms of participation available, with voting and mobilization widely used by citizens.  One 
negative effect of the nature of the transition, however, was the creation of a weak and volatile 
institutional structure. 
“The Peronists and the Radicals were not faced with the need to reach an 
agreement to force the military to yield power.  On the positive side, in 1983 the 
Argentine electorate was offered a real choice between two distinct political 
parties… Less positively, the hotly contested 1983 elections created a climate of 
confrontation and animosity between the two major parties.  As a result, the 
political mosaic of the mid-1980s combined some elements of the past and some 
new elements, in a pattern that was not strongly conducive to the consolidation of 
a competitive, nonpolarized party system” (Cavarozzi, 1992).   
 
 As will be explored when testing sub-hypothesis D with the post-transition context in 
Argentina, the perpetuation of this weak institutional structure helps explain the characteristics of 
current participation. 
 
                                                          
17
“It was not a movement that aspired to power, nor to organize a violent opposition to challenge the military 
rulers in terms of power, but rather a civic resistance that overwhelmed the regime with its demand for basic 
rights and legality, without trying to become an alternative to the political regime... It dismissed the preaching of 
violence as a method of making claims and a way of social progress ... It drew with human rights the experience of 
a nucleus of an independent sense of power, which made possible the development of a public space of 
deliberation for society. This went well beyond protest against the military regime, and contained a promise of 
political innovation for the future” (Translation by author). 
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The Tests of Sub-Hypotheses A and B Compared 
Mass mobilization in both cases undoubtedly pushed leaders towards and signaled the 
approaching transition to democracy, but the types of participation in which citizens engaged 
during the transition, what it was directed to change, and by whom, had much to do with the 
specific circumstances in each country.  In Chile, substantial support for the incumbent regime 
combined with the relative strength of the military government made it necessary to limit citizen 
participation into conventional forms because the other actors (both elites and citizens for 
following them) had agreed to the electoral rules for the transition as established by the 
government.  “As a new opposition consensus regarding the transition process began to emerge, 
the importance of collective identity in popular-sector collective action began to decline… 
collective action by the popular sectors beyond the community level was increasingly dominated 
by political parties” (Oxhorn 1994, p62).   
Argentine actors, by contrast, never agreed to electoral rules to determine the nature of 
the transition because there was no need – the military regime was crumbling, both from internal 
divisions and external forces such as their inability to govern the economy and their defeat in the 
Malvinas Islands.  There is no doubt that citizen mobilization contributed to the discrediting of 
the regime, but it was not the only factor that brought its fall.  The delegitimization that the 
collective action enforced did, however, exclude the military leaders from any part of the 
transition and the new democratic government, which was certainly not the case in Chile.  By 
agreeing to Pinochet‟s terms for the plebiscite, his opposition had to accept to the legitimacy of 
the constitution drafted by the authoritarian regime.  That decision guaranteed the extension of 
the military‟s influence into the future democratic government and therefore extensively limited 
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the structure of opportunities for participation – both in terms of institutional barriers to non-
electoral participation and by affecting the perceptions of citizens.  
While the Argentine example has been termed a more “democratically faithful” transition 
because of the active role of citizens in terms of both conventional and nonconventional 
participation and its subsequent ability to affect change in the political system, both transitions 
had both positive and negative implications.  In the years during and immediately following the 
transition to democracy in Argentina, the dynamics of the transition provided opportunities for a 
more involved and active citizenry, but also contributed to institutional instability and party 
polarization.  In comparison, Pinochet‟s influence over the transition in Chile led to the 
formation of a rigid institutional structure that limited the opportunities for citizen involvement, 
contributing to a more demobilized citizenry that participated almost exclusively by conventional 
means.  As a result of the characteristics of each transition and its effects on the institutional 
structure, citizens in both countries formed different perceptions in regards to the effectiveness, 
legitimacy, and risk of different types of participation in the political system.  These perceptions, 
as well as other longer-term effects of both transitions are the subject of the next two sections of 
this study, where the transition-era structure of opportunities evolves over time and affects 
participation currently in the case studies. 
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Testing Sub-Hypothesis C with the Chilean Case: Opportunity Structure A produces a 
limited repertoire of political participation available, familiar to, and therefore used by 
citizens 
Continuing from where sub-hypothesis A concluded, the socialization process resulting from 
the transition to democracy produced a limited repertoire of participation available and therefore 
practiced by citizens in Chile.  Formal representative institutions became the legitimate and 
accepted pathways for involvement in the system, especially political parties and elections.  This 
does not intend to argue that civilian desire to participate was any less in Chile than it was in 
Argentina, but rather that there were less mechanisms to do so that were perceived and 
experienced as functional. 
As examined above, citizen mobilization was an important form of participation at 
various points during the military regime and in the years before the transition in Chile; however, 
due to the nature of the transition, political participation was limited by a variety of factors, both 
institutional and perceptional.  After the student movement mobilizations that pushed for 
democratization in the mid-1980s, there was a marked decline in citizen mobilization.  From the 
perspective of the citizenry, elections had been called, the transition to democracy was in sight, 
and for many of those involved in the protests there was overall sense of accomplishment.  
Added to each individual‟s analysis and satisfaction on the process of the transition was their 
perception of risk and cost-benefit analysis of participating in certain ways.  One man, who was a 
member of a student group during the transition remembered: 
“We really felt that we accomplished something.  We decided that democracy was 
more important than what they could do to us... Everyone was involved, even if 
they wouldn‟t talk about it.  When you drove down the street, people who wanted 
Pinochet out of power would put on their windshield wipers to tell each other they 
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were in favor... Even if it did not happen exactly how we wanted, we were going 
to stand by the system we helped to create...” – Male, 40s, Santiago (Interview, 
March 9, 2011).    
 
From the perspective of the opposition parties, after elections had been organized, 
mobilization and other non-electoral forms of participation were not effective means of 
accomplishing their goals and in fact, were seen as detrimental to them.   
“Having been demobilized as an autonomous social actor in the transition process, 
the popular sectors have found it all but impossible to recapture the political 
influence they had exhibited during the military regime… The protest movement 
in which they had participated was now considered a failure.  The leaders of 
popular organizations were no longer in a position to innovate alternative forms of 
political participation in a context dominated by political parties intent upon 
restoring traditional ones” (Oxhorn 1994, p64). 
 
Having incorporated the leadership from groups that had mobilized in the past, especially 
student organizations, into the formal party system, there was little institutional encouragement 
and a certain implicit degree of discouragement of participation outside of elections.
18
  This 
pattern is something that has not changed extensively from when the transition occurred to the 
present day.   
  
                                                          
18
 See Oxhorn, 1994, Luna, 2010, and Appendix E: Interview Notes: Chile. 
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Figure 4: Model of Sub-hypothesis C as represented by the Chilean context 
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The restrictions on the socialization process were both perceived and tangible authoritarian 
legacies left by Pinochet‟s regime, such as the limitations on the political system and 
participation concretely put into the constitution.  Another was the continued presence of former 
regime leaders in the political system and the perceived risk that presented for both citizens and 
politicians.   
Pinochet retained an active, high-level position in the government until his health seriously 
declined in 1998, when he traveled to England for surgery.  Pinochet‟s involvement not only 
affected the institutional framework, it also clearly altered the opportunities for participation 
perceived by citizens.  While there was a democratic government in place beginning in 1990, in 
the eight years of democracy following the transition, the memory of repression and the risk of 
non-government accepted forms of participation remained for civilians and politicians alike, a 
dynamic that has not completely vanished: 
 
“I did not vote for Piñera.  I could never vote for someone from the Alianza.  I 
can‟t give my vote to someone from the party that supported Pinochet” – Male, 
40s, Santiago (Interview, March 9, 2011). 
  
Some of the major weaknesses in the new Chilean political system were those put in place 
with the Constitution of 1980, among which were a number of provisions for the continuity of 
the incumbent government in the democratic regime, such as the inability to remove Pinochet as 
chief of the army, as well as guaranteed positions of three other junta members, until 1998.  All 
four were voting members of the eight-member National Security Council, which approves or 
rejects any decisions regarding national defense or the military.  As the opposition agreed to this 
constitution, the only option available to them was to revise it.  Pinochet protected against this as 
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well, however, as a key de jure limitation on the new regime‟s policy-making ability created the 
constitutional right of the outgoing regime to appoint nine of the forty-seven members of 
Congress, which, combined with the seats won by the rightist parties, left the Concertación two 
votes short of the 60% majority it needed to change the constitution.  In addition, a 
Constitutional Court, whose seven members were all appointed by Pinochet and could not be 
removed until he retired, had the final approval or rejection of constitutional changes.
19
   
In order to eliminate the „authoritarian legacies‟ that were thus embedded in the political 
institutions, the subsequent democratic governments worked to reform the Constitution and 
economic policy in a controlled and gradual way, as to not disrupt the stability of the system and 
risk another military coup.  “If economic policy had strayed too far from the general outline of 
the Pinochet model, there would certainly have been a backlash.  At the same time, ignoring 
problems with the Pinochet model would have undermined the legitimacy of the new 
government... The right and the left both agree on the essential model, in a pattern departing 
from the norm in much of the rest of the region” (Siavelis 2008, p182).  Although the 
Constitution was reformed several times, the process was largely contained behind closed-doors 
between party leaders and serious deficits in the democratic system still remain as a result.  This 
was found to be true not only in national-level institutions, as Siavelis found, but also at the 
local-level, as the study by Paul Posner found: 
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 See Linz and Stepan 1996; and Siavelis 2000. 
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“Institutional arrangements limit public 
officials‟ accountability to their 
constituents and severely circumscribe 
opportunities for citizens‟ input in 
decisionmaking, creating a vicious cycle 
of low levels of participation and limited 
accountability… Such conditions fit well 
with the desire of elites of both the right 
and the Concertación to depoliticize civil 
society in order to preserve 
macroeconomic and political stability.  
Yet they leave in doubt the efficacy of 
popular participation and the strength of 
local democracy in Chile” (Posner 2004, 
75). 
 
Beyond this presence of authoritarian legacies, the 
governments after the transition in Chile were more 
successful in addressing citizen needs than those 
governments in Argentina.
20
  As Peter Siavelis argued, 
“Continuity in the pattern of post-authoritarian politics as 
well as much of the success of the so-called Chilean model 
of transition are due in large part to the establishment of a 
new informal social pact that has set down mutually and 
tacitly understood rules of the game” (2008, p177).  His 
analysis holds that a consensus on the socioeconomic 
structure and the policies to achieve economic and social 
progress allowed the elites to maintain consistent policies 
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 See, for example, Angell, 2010, and Mainwaring and Scully, 2010. 
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and stable growth rates while slowly altering the former regime‟s strategy.  This array of 
institutional challenges, combined with the active presence of the former regime, required much 
tactical skill to create successful policy and democratic governance.   
Since the reemergence of democracy, conventional participation, especially electoral, has 
been dominant and this continues today.  Political elites in Chile have consistently attempted to 
maintain the pace and nature of change under the control of the political parties and demobilizing 
society and with a couple of small-scale exceptions, this strategy was generally met unchallenged 
by the mainstream citizenry.  From the interviews conducted for this study, most of the Chilean 
citizens interviewed did not see protest as an effective tool in provoking a positive change in the 
current political framework.
21
  This does not mean that mobilization is not used at all, but it does 
help explain why, when such incidents do occur in Chile, they tend to be relatively small in 
scope and demands and are generally led by specific groups. Dr. Juan Pablo Luna described 
recent mobilization in Chile as “spasmodic, anomic protest”, citing the examples of the “Penguin 
Revolution” or the protests over gas prices (Interview, March 8, 2011). 
When asked his opinion on why Chileans do not mobilize much, Sebastian Pavlovic, a 
student organization leader in the 1990s said that the dictatorship generated demobilization, and 
that the dictatorship destroyed the “social fabric” of the society and put individualism in its 
place, resulting in distrust in mobilization.  Even student organizations, which are expected to be 
the most mobilized group in society, have only engaged in one large-scale mobilization since the 
transition to democracy.  Pavlovic explained that student organizations have not really mobilized 
en mass since the 1980s, that in the 1990s there were small mobilizations focused on demands 
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 See Appendix E: Interview Notes: Chile 
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that were directed specifically towards their school, and that now 
they primarily focus on social work (Interview, March 18, 2011). 
The largest example of collective action in recent years is 
the “Penguin Revolution” of 2006, where 70,000 students 
protested school bus fares and university entrance exam fees.  
Another example is the outbreak of protests in 2010 in the south 
of Chile which attracted 1,000 participants in response to a 17% 
increase in gas prices.
22
 
Generally frowned upon in the past, mobilization seemed 
to be tolerated, even supported by the Bachelet administration – 
or at least at first.  When the “Penguin Revolution” started, the 
President initially reacted with cautious support, but as the 
protests gained strength and attention, the administration 
changed their position and called for a return to order.  
“Bachelet‟s surprise at the scope and intensity 
of the student protests shows that even a 
politician who purports to be in touch with the 
people can be betrayed by the politics of 
interelite settlement… The recent student and 
labor protests also suggest a bubbling of 
discontent beneath what appears to be a 
successful transition.  Electoral participation 
has been steadily declining in Chile since the 
return of democracy, which is perhaps a 
reflection of growing disillusionment with the 
transitional model of politics” (Siavelis 2008, 
p202).  
                                                          
22
 Data taken from BBC News, www.bbc.org. 
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There is also much debate over protests by the Mapuche people, who have been engaging 
in collective action for decades in an attempt to regain their ancestral lands and are increasingly 
using armed resistance as a tactic.  The group claims that this is an appropriate response to the 
refusal of the government to change the country‟s terrorism law that dates back to the Pinochet 
regime and since 1990 has been used primarily against Mapuche activists.  Although the law was 
changed in 2010 to where the presumption of terrorist intentions no longer trumps the 
presumption of innocence among other revisions, the protests and debates continue.
23
 
When asked his opinion regarding the role of non-electoral participation, Deputy Javier 
Macaya maintained that mobilization gets in the way of necessary reforms that the government 
needs to initiate (Interview, February 25, 2011).  Mayor Juan Paolo Molina said that non-
electoral participation should be logical - that an organization of citizens should petition a 
government authority, who will then pass their concerns to the government.  If these are 
representative viewpoints of the government, this could explain the relatively high level of 
contacting in the Chilean political system.  While contacting is not electoral participation, it is 
closely related, as those officials from whom citizens are soliciting help are generally elected 
officials (see Table 5). 
Non-representative-based participation is not just limited by the socialization of the 
citizenry in post-transition Chile, but also by institutional factors – ones that raise the cost of 
such participation, but also ones that encourage representational-based participation.  Those 
institutional factors that limit participation are mostly in the form of laws, such as the anti-
terrorism law mentioned above and the requirement that all public demonstrations must be 
registered before the event.  Public protests must be pre-registered by submitting a written 
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 See The Economist, “Chile’s Mapuche’s: Trying Violence” and Interview with Gabriela Delamata in Appendix E. 
 51 
application at least five days in advance to the government, stating the purpose of the event, the 
location that the event will begin, the path the protest will follow, any places where words will 
be used, the names of any speakers who will participate, and the location where the 
demonstration will end; reasons that permission for the protest may be denied include a „negative 
report from the police‟ or a „lack of completion of requirements‟ (Guía del servicios del estado, 
http://www.chileclic.gob.cl). 
 While the position of the government is generally unfavorable towards mobilization, this 
does not imply that it does not want citizens to participate – on the contrary, there are advocates 
from both the right and the left who are advocating a new law that would make voter registration 
mandatory.  A major concern for some politicians is declining voter turnout, a situation that they 
blame on the current laws which make voting obligatory, but not registration, leading to less 
registered voters and a subsequent decline in the percentage of people voting.  While the 
effectiveness of such a law to change citizen desire to vote is questionable, it would be another, 
although different, mechanism to encourage electoral participation.
24
 
“It is true that young people see politics as very distant... politicians know that it is going 
on, but they have little incentive to find a solution since the youth are not registered to 
vote... If registration becomes mandatory, it will change this.  There will no longer be a 
captive public, but a more free-floating one... Politics will be much more personalistic 
and more like entertainment.” Dr. Eugenio Tironi (Interview, March 16, 2011)   
  
Levels and types of participation in the current Chilean context can therefore be seen as a 
mixture of both institutional and perceptional factors that limit some types of participation and 
encourage others.  It should be noted, however, that many, as the data from both opinion polls 
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 For works on the voluntary versus mandatory vote in Chile, see, for example, Morales, Cantillana, and Gonzalez, 
2010, and Morales, 2011.  
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and interviews show, do not participate at all.  Those interviewed who do not participate see 
attempting to affect political process as pointless: 
 
“I consider myself apolitical... No matter what party they are from or what they 
claim, I feel that all politicians always have their own private agenda” – Female, 
40s, Pichileymu (Interview, February 27, 2011). 
 
“The people that are in power don‟t want things to change, so it‟s very hard to 
change politics” – Male, 20s, Santiago (Interview, March 7, 2011). 
 
Even the majority of formal mechanisms that are intended to encourage participation are 
limited in their ability to influence political institutions.  The neighborhood assembly 
organizations, in which citizens discuss, debate, and create recommendations to policy-makers, 
have no formal power and, considered advisory groups, these organizations and their 
recommendations are generally disregarded by lawmakers.  Similarly, the mechanism of a 
popular, direct vote is available to incorporate citizen participation, but, as one lawyer/politician 
explained, they are too expensive and require too much time and resources to be used (Interview, 
February 24, 2011).  In short, there are institutional mechanisms that limit both citizen ability to 
participate, as well as the capacity of the available forms of participation to affect the political 
system, both of which contribute to the formation of how citizens think about participation in its 
various forms. 
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Testing Sub-Hypothesis D with the Argentine Case: Opportunity Structure B produces a 
broader repertoire of political participation available, familiar to, and therefore used by 
citizens 
Since the Argentine transition to democracy, the country has been plagued by both 
political and economic crises as a result of ineffective leadership and institutional fragility, 
during which citizen participation in many forms has played an important role in the evolution, if 
not the survival of democracy.  Without any significant institutional or perceived limitations, all 
forms of participation were available to citizens beginning with the first election in 1983, but 
which ones have been used and in what circumstances seem to be the result of citizens‟ 
subjective interpretation of the relationship between participation and the functioning of the 
political system.   
The events of 2001 were the most blatant representation of this dynamic, with a drastic 
spike in nonconventional participation as a reaction against what citizens perceived as the 
disfunctionality of political institutions and ineffective politicians.  In response to government 
freezing of savings in banks, unemployment, and perceived government unresponsiveness to 
problems of the society, civilians took to the streets across the country, banging pots and pans, 
blocking roads, ransacking politicians‟ homes, and gathering in the plazas.  In the culmination of 
these events, citizens gathered around the rallying cry “Que se vayan todos” or “They all must 
go” as an expression of the rejection of all politicians, who citizens deemed as corrupt, 
ineffective, and contributing to the erosion of democracy.  Regarding the events of 2001, one 
woman said she remembered “all the people in the streets, just trying to make the world 
function” (Interview with Gabriela Delamata, March 21, 2011).  Weak institutional mechanisms 
and conventional participation within them were unable to return stability to the country, and the 
general mindset of the public was that citizens needed to take action to change the system.   
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“The force of that expression could not be but 
negative: the heterogeneous convergence round a 
common rejection of the political representation was 
exercised.  This political negativity created a vacuum 
of representation and opened up all the possibilities 
of renewal… The citizen veto that that triggered 
President de la Rúa‟s resignation unblocked the 
institutional impasse that institutional measures 
could not” (Cheresky 2006, p103). 
 
What resulted was the complete collapse of the 
representational and economic systems.  Protests were 
numerous and large in scope – in regards to the quantity of 
participants, the geographical spread, and the issues they 
addressed.  Although these events temporarily paralyzed the 
political system, the space that they created was eventually 
filled with renewed institutions and a dynamic relationship 
between the political system, the citizenry, and 
representatives.  This change has not completely eradicated 
the generalized distrust against politicians, nor the negative 
outlook on politics, but has reaffirmed Argentine citizens‟ 
commitment to participation in whatever form they deem 
effective, and a sense of pride in being able to produce 
political change.   
“It was good, very good... It was a 
movement that said „no‟ to everything... 
We changed things.” Male, 30s, Outside of 
Cordoba (Interview, February 1, 2011) 
 
 
La Casa Rosada (house of the 
government) from the Plaza de 
Mayo.  White symbols represent the 
“Madres de la Plaza de Mayo” 
movement.  Black fence is 
permanent, as a crowd-control 
tool. Buenos Aires, Argentina. 
March, 2011. 
 
Veteran organization protest 
camp, which has been set-up in the 
Plaza for months. Buenos Aires, 
Argentina. March, 2011. 
 
One of the signs from the veteran 
protest camp.  It reads: “In the 
bicentennial year, we continue to 
be forgotten...” Buenos Aires, 
Argentina. March, 2011. 
(All photographs taken by the 
author) 
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“What seemed impossible is not impossible.  When the cause is just, and it has the 
popular support and mobilization, it brings sensibility, and it will be remembered 
the week of the vote…  Everything that has been accomplished in the last years 
has been though large mobilizations.” Deputy and Presidential Candidate “Pino” 
Solana (Interview, January 30, 2011) 
 
Most of those interviewed felt proud of their or others‟ involvement in protests against 
the government, whether it was kicking a corrupt politician out of office, joining in a cacerolazo, 
student protests against laws or government corruption, or mobilizing as an organization.  When 
asked about her opinions of a recent student-led movement that protested against a law that 
would bring major changes to the education system, including the option for the incorporation of 
religion into public schools‟ curriculum, one schoolteacher said, “I am very proud of those kids.  
They stood up for what they believed in.  That was the only way to make themselves heard... I 
only hope that one day it will be those kids running the country” (Interview with “C”, February 
1, 2011).  
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Figure 5: Model of Sub-hypothesis D as represented by the Argentine context 
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When asked about the current relationship between traditional institutions and the 
citizenry, Dr. Alejandro Bonvecchi maintained that such mechanisms, especially political parties, 
are not a major determining factor in political alignment or participation in the current Argentine 
system.  He argued that there are two ways citizens relate to the parties.  They either see them as 
ineffective and therefore participate through other means, or people regain faith in the parties, 
but demand too much from them, that they “require political parties to do certain things that they 
are incapable of doing”.  He sees this as a product of history, where repetitive breakdowns of the 
political system have never allowed parties to build up functional capacity, nor the desire to do 
so – “why invest in political organization if you don‟t know how long it will last?”  The two 
ways that people think about political institutions create a cycle of disappointment, where they 
want to believe in the power of conventional mechanisms, become disillusioned because of the 
weakness of institutions, and therefore continue to rely on non-party mobilization, which has 
long been seen as an effective and legitimate tool for participation (Interview with Dr. 
Bonvecchi, March 18, 2011).   
There has not been another episode of collective action to the extent of that in 2001, 
which brought about four different presidents in a week, but collective action remains an 
important form of political participation and a permanent feature of society, as has participation 
of many forms.  This does not suggest that the nature of participation in Argentina is static, as the 
data from both the public opinion polls and interviews demonstrate, but rather that both 
conventional and nonconventional forms of participation have been tested and incorporated into 
the society‟s repertoire.  In fact, scholars have noted the movement of citizens away from 
traditional representative mechanisms like political parties, due, in part, to the perpetuation of 
negative opinions and beliefs about politics, as well as contributes to the formation of an 
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“autonomous citizenry” - one that demands acknowledgement from their leaders, accountability 
for the actions of politicians, and takes politics beyond the normal boundaries of traditional 
spaces, actors, and mechanisms.
25
   
Although they are less aligned with traditional mechanisms, conventional forms of 
participation are still used, but are used complimentary to nonconventional forms.  In other 
words, people do not choose protesting instead of voting, but rather have seen the success of 
using multiple forms of participation together to accomplish change, as was the case during the 
transition in 1983 when mobilization and voting were employed, in the period 2001-2003 when 
mobilization and voting were combined again, and how contacting, voting, mobilization and 
party activity are combined in the current efforts of many local civil society organizations.
26
  As 
Dr. Helena Rovner explained, the Argentine citizenry does not “switch” between exclusively 
conventional or nonconventional participation, but that “different political moments are more 
fruitful for certain types of participation” (Interview, March 18, 2011). 
From the data collected from interviews, the combined use of conventional and 
nonconventional participation appears to result from the lack of confidence in institutions, but 
with no desire to undermine the role that formal mechanisms should have in the functioning of 
democracy.  In other words, because politically-active citizens have less faith in the current 
ability of formal mechanisms to impact the political system, they bolster them with tools like 
mobilization that have proven effective during and after the transition to democracy, as opposed 
to replacing conventional participation altogether.   
                                                          
25
 See, for example, Cheresky, 2006 and 2008; Delamata, 2009; and Massetti, Villanueva, and Gomez, 2010. 
26
 See, for example, Interviews at Meeting of Civil Society Organizations of Carlos Paz, Argentina, on January 30, 
2011. 
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“All forms of participation are important, 
they‟re just different… There is a lot of fraud 
in elections.  We need to educate young people 
about things like that so that they don‟t step on 
us from above.” Female, 18, Outside of Carlos 
Paz (Interview, January 28, 2011) 
 
The analysis above demonstrates the patterns of 
observable participation in Argentina, but this does not mean to 
overestimate the national levels of citizen involvement.  Overall, 
there is still a relatively low degree of participation in the 
country.  Those interviewed who do not have an interest in 
politics provided reasons that seem very much in-line with the 
characteristics of political disaffection: 
 “I observe politics for my work, but other 
than that I just vote... It‟s impossible to change 
the system” – Male, 30s, Buenos Aires 
(Interview, January 29, 2011). 
 
“Politics is a process... politicians know the 
process, but it is their process”– Male, 30s, 
Buenos Aires (Interview, January 13, 2011). 
 
“The problem here, like everywhere, is the 
politicians with their own agendas” – Male, 
70s, Buenos Aires (Interview, January 20, 
2011). 
 
“If voting wasn‟t mandatory, I think no one 
would vote.  No one wants to associate 
themselves with something they don‟t 
believe in...” – Female, 30s, Córdoba 
(Interview with “S”, January 28, 2011). 
 
 
 
 
Grafiti on government building in 
the Plaza de Mayo includes: “Basta 
ya de mentiras” (enough of lies 
now), “Despierten” (wake up), and 
“Si la represión es ley, la revolución 
es justicia” (If repression is law, 
revolution is justice).Buenos Aires, 
Argentina. March, 2011. 
 
 
 
Interview with two women outside 
of Córdoba, Argentina. February, 
2011. 
 
(All photographs taken by the 
author) 
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“Even though politicians make bad policies, I feel like I have to put up with it 
because who is going to listen to me?‟ ” – Female, 60s, Buenos Aires (Interview, 
January 23, 2011). 
 
 As shown in the initial data comparison, these signs of disaffection, which are more 
severe in Argentina than Chile, are not reflected in comparatively lower participation levels.  In 
addition, responses of those interviewed suggest that support for conventional participation is 
improving, as citizens‟ faith in democratic institutions is higher than in the past:  
“I did not vote for almost twenty years because I felt that no one represented me.  
I actually wanted to vote in the last two elections... I took an interest and thought 
it was worthwhile” – Female, 50s, Buenos Aires (Interview, February 7, 2011). 
 
“Kirchner didn‟t have the support of everyone, but won on the hope of many” – 
Male, 30s, Córdoba (Interview with “M”, January 30, 2011). 
 
“I support the President... It was a horrible thing when Kirchner died... He was the 
best thing that has happened in this country.  Things aren‟t great, but they are 
better than they have been in the past” – Male, 20s, Buenos Aires (Interview, 
March 19, 2011). 
 
“I support the government because they are doing good things, that they democratically 
represent the people better than any other government… I feel represented by the 
government, but not by any party.” Male, 30s, Outside of Carlos Paz (Interview, February 
2, 2011) 
 
An improving confidence in political institutions may sound like a step in the right 
direction for the Argentine political system, but academics and citizens alike seem to disagree on 
the “progress” the Kirchners have made in strengthening political institutions and implications 
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for the future of political institutions and citizen involvement.  Regardless of this debate, it has 
been shown the Argentineans are increasingly using the vote as a mechanism for retrospective 
accountability, when nonconventional means, such as the „escratche‟ were the major tools in the 
past.  Although nonconventional mechanisms have not been erased from the Argentine 
contentious repertoire, the fact that voting has become an increasingly important accountability 
mechanism suggests some level of respect for the vote as a legitimate tool and means of 
participation.
27
   
To summarize, through a historical, institutional, and perceptional analysis, it can be 
concluded that because of the nature of political institutions and traditional participation 
mechanisms and citizen opinions about them, those active in politics do not choose 
nonconventional instead of conventional participation, but rather have seen the success of using 
multiple forms together to accomplish change.  From the interview data, this is seen as effective 
by using non-electoral methods, such as contacting or protesting, to attract the government‟s or 
representative‟s attention and therefore bring issues to both politicians‟ and citizens‟ attention.  
Nonconventional participation has also been used to demand accountability when politicians and 
their policies do not meet expectations, but voting has become an increasingly important 
accountability mechanism as well. 
 
The Tests of Sub-Hypotheses C and D Compared 
Citizens in both Argentina and Chile show clear signs of political disaffection, with many 
choosing to abstain from involvement in politics as a result.  While this may progressively lower 
                                                          
27
 See, for example, Tagina, 2010. 
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participation in both countries, one clear distinction between the two cases is that overall, more 
people are participating and in a wider variety of ways in Argentina. 
Due to the almost constant institutional instability of the Argentine political system, citizens 
choose to use some forms of participation more than others at certain times, but following the 
theory of Torcal and Lago, nonconventional participation does not replace conventional, but 
instead, the two are positively correlated (2006).  Citizens who choose to participate do so by all 
methods available from the opportunity structure that they deem as effective.  For most of those 
interviewed, it was a combination of multiple forms, such as contacting, voting, and protest.  
Overall, a comparatively higher level of nonconventional participation in Argentina is not due to 
a rejection of traditional politics, but is used as a strategy to compliment and reinforce formal 
participation, such as voting, involvement in political organizations and parties, and contacting. 
While this tendency may also be true in Chile, the opportunity structure as a result of the 
limitations from the institutional framework and the socialization experience of citizens does not 
allow for many nonconventional forms of participation – government response is generally 
negative toward mobilization, and citizens generally see contacting at the local level and voting 
as the only semi-effective mechanisms to evoke a change in the political system.  The fact that 
notable change has been seen as a result of electoral participation, both by the election of the first 
non-Concertación president since the transition, as well as one of the best records of governance 
and stability in Latin America, could contribute to the maintenance of the existing opportunity 
structures, affecting citizen perceptions towards participation.   
 
 “I have more faith in the political system now... The government was stale from a 
lack of change.  I think it is good that Piñera won” – Male, 50s, Pichileymu 
(Interview, February 27, 2011). 
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“In Argentina, they are unable to be part of the institutional framework... there are 
rational incentives for participation because they see that participation can produce 
change and think „my input was important‟.  Whereas in Chile, people think „it doesn‟t 
make any difference... the system is going to be the same, the parties are going to be the 
same‟.... People in Chile still believe in the formal system, even if they don‟t take part in 
it.”  Dr. Jaime Baeza (Interview, March 3, 2011) 
 
When asked about his analysis of declining political participation, Dr. Juan Pablo Luna gave 
his self-proclaimed “pessimistic” view, claiming that political parties have always been the 
primary link between citizens and the political system, and, even though the parties are 
institutionalized, they are very weak and losing their importance.  The less people feel 
represented by and have confidence in the parties, the more a vacuum is created in that “people 
are not used to engaging in politics outside of the parties”.  He does not see any progress towards 
a solution in the parties: “They are lost... They are elite... I see two trends: one is to do Twitter 
and Facebook... the other is to create a new discourse that really mobilizes people... as an attempt 
to get votes without interacting with the people… They know they are in crisis, but no party has 
been able to come up with a strategy” (Interview, March 8, 2011).  Similarly, Dr. Eugenio Tironi 
maintains that the parties are not changing: “I do not see one, not one, change... They are not 
interested in changing things” (Interview, March 16, 2011).  Sebastian Pavlovic notes that both 
citizens and politicians are disillusioned with the political system – that politicians acknowledge 
that citizens feel estranged from their government, but they do not know how to revitalize that 
relationship and are unable to come to a consensus, especially as “neither parties nor the 
parliament are places for the generation of ideas” (Interview, March 11, 2011).  It is clear from 
the current debate within the political parties in Chile that if citizens are not participating by 
electoral forms, they are not likely to participate at all.   
 64 
This is not a major concern in Argentina, as citizens have engaged in both nonconventional 
and conventional participation since the transition in 1983.  Although electoral competition has 
always been competitive and voting has been an important tool for the citizenry, has never been 
satisfactory participation by itself to the Argentine citizenry, largely owing to the ineffectiveness 
of political institutions, therefore creating the perceived need and legitimacy for the use of both 
conventional and nonconventional methods. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 After testing the sub-hypotheses with the cases of Argentina and Chile, both elements of 
the central hypothesis are confirmed: 1) that the nature of the transition process, as determined 
by the actual and perceived strength of the incumbent authoritarian regime and its opposition, 
results in context-specific opportunity structures that facilitate some types of participation and 
inhibit others.  The case of the Chilean transformation transition led to primarily conventional 
participation (electoral and contacting), compared to openness of the political arena created by 
the replacement transition that allowed for all types of participation (conventional and 
nonconventional, such as mobilization); and 2) that the repertoires of post-authoritarian 
participation formed after the transition interact with current political institutions to explain the 
different characteristics of political participation – almost exclusively electoral and declining in 
Chile, compared to more stable, but also declining participation of a broader variety and number 
of participants in Argentina. 
 It is important to stress that institutional, perceptional, nor preexisting factors alone can 
accurately explain the current levels of participation in these two countries.  When compared, the 
characteristics of participation do not follow the expectations of existing theories because none 
of the theories incorporate the three factors, weakening their explanatory power.  While the 
traditions and characteristics of participation that were present before the authoritarian regimes in 
Argentina and Chile indisputably form the foundation as to why people participate in the 
normative sense, such as their beliefs as to the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, this is 
only a tendency or predisposition to participate in a certain way.  As Frances Hagopian argued, 
traditions and relationships between society and the state are altered in varying amounts during 
an authoritarian regime, producing different types of relationships and therefore different 
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characteristics of participation (1993).  The process of that transformation can be most accurately 
explained as the socialization process that results from the institutional and perceptional 
opportunity structures.  The lines between these two structures are often blurred, as citizen 
perceptions are often a reflection of very real institutional factors, such as the continuity of the 
incumbent regime in the Chilean democratic regime, but the perceptions of citizens are overall 
what have a greater effect on participation, as their subjective and individual cost-benefit 
analyses will ultimately determine their decision to participate and by what means.       
 Although opportunity structures help to explain the current levels of participation in these 
two cases, they are not sufficient.  To accurately do so, the present-day institutional framework 
must be included in the analysis.  Because Chilean political parties are more cohesive, stable, and 
connected to society, and citizens generally see elections as more fair and representative-based 
participation more effective in producing a change in the political system, the perceived need for 
other forms of participation is lower than in Argentina.  It has been seen through this study, 
however, that this does not suggest that Chileans have nothing to complain about, but that the 
opportunities available for voicing these concerns are more limited than in Argentina, which 
changes the political socialization of society, and interacts with the existing institutional 
structures.  This does not imply that the result of these interactions is stable.  In fact, Chilean 
political expert Eugenio Tironi speculates that if the ties between political parties and the 
citizenry in Chile continue to weaken, collective action may become more prevalent in political 
participation (Interview, March 16, 2011).   
 The opportunity structures examined in this study are, therefore, not the only important 
factor in accounting for participation in post-authoritarian Chile and Argentina, but they are a 
key part and have been largely unrepresented in the literature.  Opportunity structures and 
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socialization from them, as well as pre-transition history and political culture and institutional 
and leadership characteristics together determine the nature of current participation. 
 
Extending the Argument and Possible Implications for Future Transitions and 
Consolidations 
As a comparative study regarding a specific disjuncture between the theories on political 
participation and the data from the cases of Argentina and Chile, the specific conclusions cannot 
be generalized to other contexts.  However, this does not suggest that the models and hypotheses 
in this paper could not be used to study current participation in other countries that transitioned 
to democracy from an authoritarian regime, a project that would follow this study well.  If these 
models are found to have more generalized applicability by examining them with more cases, 
these hypotheses may help to shed some light on why citizens in such circumstances participate 
in certain ways, as well as to provide implications for citizen participation following new 
transitions to democracy in other countries. 
As was mentioned at the beginning of this study, the cases of Argentina and Chile 
represent the extremes in the Southern Cone region in various regards: the nature of the 
transition to democracy, public opinion, and post-transition citizen participation.  The Chilean 
transition was the most controlled by the incumbent regime in the Southern Cone, which 
consequently resulted in the most restricted opportunity structures for participation.  In contrast, 
the process in Argentina was a classic example of a replacement transition; the military regime 
was the weakest at the time of transition in Southern Cone region, resulting in their exclusion 
from the process and more open opportunity structures for civilian participation.   
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When expanding the cases included in the examination of opportunity structures for 
participation both during and following transitions to democracy, it is important to keep in mind 
that Argentina and Chile represent the extremes of their transition types: a rigidly controlled 
transition and a transition by complete regime collapse, where the incumbent regime was 
excluded entirely from the transition process.  It is expected that most other cases would not fit 
the characteristics of these initial findings, but would have distinct characteristics that would 
therefore create different characteristics of participation. 
The two other Southern Cone countries are a natural choice for extending the number of 
cases in the study.  The pace and process of the Brazilian transition was highly controlled by the 
incumbent regime, but was not as repressive against citizen participation, introduced local-level 
democracy well before the actual transition occurred and had a broader socialization process 
post-transition; the Brazilian case could therefore be considered to confirm the sub-hypotheses A 
and C model, but would certainly not have the exact characteristics of the Chilean case.  Uruguay 
is the only Southern Cone case that is considered a „pacted‟ or „transplacement‟ transition, where 
the relative strength of the democratic opposition and the incumbent regime were more equal, 
forcing both sides to reach certain agreements and concessions, known as pacts.  Huntington 
defines this transition type as those where… 
“Democratization is produced by the combined actions of government and 
opposition.  Within the government the balance between standpatters and 
reformers is such that the government is willing to negotiate a change of regime – 
unlike the situation of standpatter dominance that leads to replacement – but it is 
unwilling to initiate a change of regime.  It has to be pushed and/or pulled into 
formal or informal negotiations with the opposition.  Within the opposition 
democratic moderates are strong enough to prevail over antidemocratic radicals, 
but they are not strong enough to overthrow the government.  Hence they see 
virtues in negotiation” (1991, p151). 
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As the authoritarian regime did not unilaterally set the terms for the process, the 
opportunity structures were more open than in the Chilean or Brazilian cases, but not to the 
extent of those in Argentina. 
Because the sub-hypotheses only address the transition types found in Argentina and 
Chile (transition by regime collapse and controlled transition), adding in the Uruguayan case will 
necessitate the formation of another set of sub-hypotheses.  
 Sub-Hypothesis A: If the authoritarian regime maintains control over the 
transition process, the transformation transition will severely limit the opportunity 
structures for citizen participation, limiting citizens to primarily representational-
based forms (Opportunity Structure A). 
 Sub-hypothesis B: As the authoritarian regime maintains some control over the 
transition, but is weak enough to necessitate pacting with its opposition, a 
transplacement transition will occur, creating relatively limited opportunity 
structures for participation (Opportunity Structure B) that result from the struggles 
of the incumbent regime and its opposition to gain more control over the process.   
 Sub-Hypothesis C (formerly sub-hypothesis B): If the authoritarian regime 
does not have control over the transition process, a replacement transition will 
occur and citizens will have more open opportunity structures for participation 
(Opportunity Structure C). 
 Sub-Hypothesis D (formerly sub-hypothesis C): Opportunity Structure A 
produces a primarily representational-based repertoire of political participation 
available, familiar to, and therefore used by citizens. 
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 Sub-Hypothesis E (formerly sub-hypothesis D): Opportunity Structure B 
produces the formation and socialization of a broad repertoire of political 
participation available, familiar to, and therefore used by citizens, where 
nonrepresentational-based forms play a key role. 
 Sub-Hypothesis F: Opportunity Structure C produces the formation and 
socialization of a repertoire of political participation that employs both 
representational-based and nonrepresentational-based forms, but where the 
citizenry relies heavily on nonrepresentational-based participation. 
Adding the cases of Brazil and Uruguay would therefore test the model in all Southern 
Cone countries and, if the hypotheses are confirmed, it can be theorized as a regional model, as 
well as could have general implications for the effect of transition types on future political 
participation, as it would include all three types of transitions - „transformation‟. 
„transplacement‟, and „replacement‟.  The possible implications for this study are therefore 
important and can fill a void in the field.   By applying of the concept of opportunity structures, 
students and scholars examining the characteristics and dynamics of participation in post-
transition democracies, especially those in Latin America, seem to have divided themselves into 
two distinct camps: those focusing on the elite-centered approach, and those who examine the 
role of civil society.  In order to accurately analyze political participation in such contexts, a 
comprehensive approach is needed – one that takes into account institutional and perceptional 
factors, gives due attention to historical processes, and examines macro-level variables, such as 
culture and interpersonal trust, in the context of these other variables that change pre-existing 
tendencies into practiced forms of participation. 
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Appendix A: Political Disaffection in Chile and Argentina within the Latin American 
Context 
 
These tables represent the average agreement of citizens in both Chile and Argentina to 
statements regarding their country‟s political systems, as well as the national percentage as a 
ranked score in the context of nineteen Latin American countries. 
 
I. Average Trust in Political Parties 
 Percentage Ranking out of 19 Latin 
American Countries 
Chile 41.0% 2
nd
 
Argentina 31.4% 13
th
  
 
II. Average Agreement that Political Parties Represent their Voters 
 Percentage Ranking out of 19 Latin 
American Countries 
Chile 43.5% 6
th
  
Argentina 34.9% 12
th
  
 
III. Average Belief that Political Parties Listen to the People 
 Percentage Ranking out of 19 Latin 
American Countries 
Chile 38.6% 2
nd
 
Argentina 31.1% 12
th
  
 
IV. Average Participation in Meetings of Political Parties 
 Percentage Ranking out of 19 Latin 
American Countries 
Chile 1.6% 19
th
  
Argentina 7.5% 9
th
  
 
 
75 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Data  and three figures taken from the AmericasBarometer Insights Series, 3/31/09, 4/5/10, 4/19/2010. 
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Appendix B: Sample Interview Topics 
 
The following are questions that may be introduced during an interview.  I hope for them to act 
as “trigger questions” which will inspire people to talk about the theme of democracy and citizen 
participation in their country. 
 
 Do you think democracy is a good thing? 
 
 What does democracy mean to you? 
 
 How do you feel about democracy in your country? 
 
 Do you think it functions the way it should?  Why or why not? 
 
 How do you feel about politicians? 
 
 Do you think citizens have an impact on the government?  If so, why?  If not, why not? 
 
 In your lifetime, do you feel that your country has become more or less democratic?  
Please explain. 
 
 Do you remember any specific moments where you felt your participation made a 
difference in what the government decided?   
o What about what you have seen other citizens do?   
o Tell me about it... 
 
 What do you think should be done to improve the democracy in your country? 
 
  
 77 
Appendix C: Interview Question Guidelines for Politicians 
 
 
 What do you think about the functioning of democracy in Chile/Argentina? 
o What are its strongest parts and which parts need improvement?  
 
 What are the roles of electoral and non-electoral participation in the political system? 
 
 Participation levels here have been consistently dropping and, according to public 
opinion polls, citizens feel increasingly disconnected from the political system.  Do you 
feel that is a problem and if so, what do you believe is the cause? 
 
 How can both the State and society improve the relationship between politicians/political 
institutions and the citizenry?  
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Appendix D: Interview Notes – Argentina 
 
 
Buenos Aires 
 
Male, 30s, hotel employee - January 13, 2011 
 
 All politicians corrupt 
 “Populist rhetoric” of Kirchner/Fernandez de Kirchner a lie 
 Argentine people/society are uninformed/unaware of what is going on inside and outside 
of country, politically speaking 
 “la politica es un proceso… los politicos conocen el proceso, pero es su proceso” 
 Lived in Spain 3 years, worked in various stores 
 Reads “El Pais” everyday, doesn‟t like Argentine newspapers – thinks they‟re outdated, 
provincial, unclear 
 Interest in politics “como diversion”; studied politics for one year, but became 
disillusioned “ahora que estoy mayor” 
 Admires Spanish politics (clear, progressive, socialist); says Spanish politicians actually 
do something, whereas Argentine politicians “no hacen nada” 
 Likes hip-hop and jazz as a form of identity; “Nunca pasaría en este país” 
 “La gente argentina no es preparada para entrar en la política” 
 Kirchner corrupt, but when he died, “se hizo un heroe”; connected it to history of 
Peronism and personalistic leadership of the masses 
 
Male, 70s, Retired Journalist - January 20, 2011 
 
 Met him outside of the National Library, which was closed 
 Spoke English 
 Born in Buenos Aires, lived in Miami for 30 years; worked for a newspaper there; his 
children have lived in both countries 
 “The problem here, like everywhere, is the politicians”; negativity; workings towards 
own agendas, no way to accomplish anything with so much bad talk 
 Talking to his son (computer engenieer) and agreed that a major change is coming in the 
world; a good change; people opening their minds more and more; need to change with 
the times, not stay closed in the world of yesterday” 
 
Female, 30s and 60s, Mother and daughter store owners - January 23, 2011  
 
 Mother owns the shop, interested in politics 
 Daughter helps, not interested in politics 
o Wouldn‟t vote if it wasn‟t mandatory; doesn‟t read newspapers 
 Mother – 
o Problem with young people, drugs, don‟t do anything, don‟t have goals; “Build a 
house, get a job, do something!” 
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o Proud of cacerolazo in 2001, but said that people like herself felt bad afterwards 
because it led to violence from extremists; felt responsible for it and now don‟t 
want to participate in that way anymore 
o Thinks that politicians are more and more disinterested with what the people 
think; when I asked her why she doesn‟t participate in other ways than vote, she 
replied “Quien me va a escuchar?” 
o Citizens put up with politicians‟ decisions and don‟t react against them as they did 
in the past; complacent; have to “aguantar”  
 
Male, 50s, University Professor - February 7, 2011 
 
 2001: his opinion is that protests in Buenos Aires were almost exclusively about savings 
 Importance of trade unions in political scene 
 A lot of violence in society (both organized and spontaneous) 
 People in large cities vote for Radical Party, “campo” votes for Peronists 
 2001 claimed to be an all-inclusive movement, but people had closed minds; he had a 
negative outlook on events of 2001 
 Only talk about politics amongst people with whom you agree 
 Lots of corruption, blatant violations of electoral rules 
 
Female, 50s, Artist - February 7, 2011 
 
 Even though voting mandatory by law, did not vote for years because “no one 
represented me” and did not want to support someone who wasn‟t going to support her 
 Last two elections, she wanted to vote, but had to pay a fine first for the years she did not 
vote 
 Doesn‟t think that the government should obligate you to vote 
 Read an article to me that commented that Argentines vote for politicians who promise 
big changes, but then always do the opposite, whereas in the US, people vote for 
politicians who promise change, but then don‟t change anything. 
 
Male, 30s, International Investment Banker - January 29, 2011 
 
 Observes politics for his work, but doesn‟t participate other than voting 
 “No one can change the system… Its impossible to change the system” 
 
Male, 30s, Graphic Designer- February 9, 2011 
 
 From Venezuela, lived in Buenos Aires for five years 
 Prefers leftist system of Argentina, not Venezuela because of “extreme populism” of 
Chavez; “una dictadura total” 
 Interested in politics, but “no one here wants to talk about it” 
 Sees Argentineans as complaining a lot, but no participation 
 Thinks Latin American politicians still have the mentality that the US system and frame 
of mind is better, that they aspire to that. 
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Male, 20s, Works in tourism and as local volunteer, March 19, 2011 
 
 Very interested in politics, reads newspapers everyday 
 Votes, volunteers in community by teaching martial arts to youth 
 Defines himself as a Peronist, “pero en su sentido historico... de base” 
 “Yo apoyo a la presidenta... fue una cosa horrible cuando se murió Kirchner”; supported 
the idea of Kirchner and Fernandez de Kirchner alternating to serve a total of 4 terms 
together; thinks that Kirchner is “lo mejor que ha pasado en este país” 
 “Things aren‟t great, but they are better than they were in the past” 
 Likes nationalistic government 
 
 Female, 20s, Receptionist - March 19, 2011 
 
 Seemed surprised when I explained what I was doing and asked me why I was studying 
politics here; she responded with “la política aquí es una mierda… mucha corrupción” 
 Votes because she has to by law, but doesn‟t participate other than that; sees politics as a 
corrupt game and doesn‟t want to be involved  
 
Dra. María Laura Tagina - February 17, 2011 
 
 Advisory interview – recommended sources, raised some questions 
 
Dra. Helena Rovner - March 18, 2011 
 In 80s there was extensive participation, both in numbers of participants and in terms of 
conventional and nonconventional types of participation 
 People participate more now than in the 90s 
 Boom of nonconventional, non-institutional participation during the crisis 
 Compared to other countries in Latin America, Argentina‟s political arena is more 
verbally conflictive 
 Youth participating more in new ways (social networks, etc) 
 Currently not a very participatory active moment in Argentina, compared to other 
moments in history 
 Participation moved away from traditional institutions and actors during the crisis, has 
continued to today. 
 Citizenry does not “switch” between exclusively conventional or nonconventional 
participation, just that “different political moments are more fruitful for certain types of 
participation” 
 Chile was always more “normal” than Argentina, politically speaking 
 “Argentina is a country where politics always becomes not-normal”, instability 
 Politics is Chile is more “boring” than in Argentina, less attractive to citizenry (news) 
 Socialization plays a big role in participation – what is “normal” depends on this process 
in each country 
 Political arena more open in Argentina 
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 Chileans have seen that political arena is not open, so they have less motivation to 
participate.  They can not influence change as much in Argentina. 
 
 
Dr. Alejandro Bonvecchi - March 18, 2011  
 
 Highly stratified social and political structure in Chile 
 In Argentina, no defined political elite; everyone knows everyone; fluid, open political 
structures creates lots of competition at street level for votes, which leads to mobilization 
 History of party system in Argentina; two party system, more democratic breakdowns 
than in Chile, Armed Forces functioned as 3
rd
 party 
 In Chile, more consolidated party system, more predictable 
 Argentine Armed Forces “discredited electoral politics” by weakening political parties 
and “made direct action more attractive” 
 Some people don‟t go to parties because they see them as ineffective and therefore see 
non-party mobilization as legitimate 
 Others who build confidence in parties become disappointed because “require political 
parties to do certain things that they are incapable of doing”.  Parties have no history of 
effective organization – “why invest in political organization if you don‟t know how long 
it will last?” 
 Argentina always had very competitive electoral politics 
 Argentina never had a strong and defined political elite, like in Chile. 
 Hard to tell how people will react to current coalition – will eventually collapse because 
it is not affordable, opposition parties not able to do much 
 Only thing that could possibly bring an end to nonconventional participation would be a 
leader who is very popular and against direct action, regardless of party ties. 
 President in Argentina has always been strong and therefore didn‟t need a strong party 
system 
 Does not see political parties regaining strength at national level (possibly grassroots) 
 
Dra. Gabriela Delamata - March 21, 2011 
 
 Government tolerance of mobilization is an important factor 
 Growing expectations of judicial power 
 Core of democratic practice is “participatory moral” 
 Persistance of mobilization as a legitimate form of participation because of history and 
innovation.  Mobilization during transition, especially the human rights movements, 
reinforced previous notions of rights, which are now central in how citizens think about 
participation – citizens have to fight for the state to respect their rights, not given to them 
by state. 
 Professionalization of politics in Chile 
 Sees less confidence in institutions as a reason behind nonconventional participation 
 Argentina characterized by an expanded public sphere, whereas Chile is characterized by 
continuity 
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 Argentina: “All the people in the streets, just trying to make the world function” 
 Argentineans believe in the legitimacy of alternate strategies for participation 
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Córdoba, Carlos Paz, and Surrounding Areas 
 
 
“M”: Male, 30s, Works for Municipal Government  - January 25 - February 3, 2011\ 
 Believes in the power of local participation 
 Proud of history of mobilization 
 Kirchner elected because of hopes of many 
 
“S”: Female, 30s, Teacher - January 25 - February 3, 2011 
 Skeptical of politics 
 Parents told them when they were little not to talk about politics and that has stayed with 
her 
 If voting were not mandatory, no one would vote.  Do not want to be associated with 
something they don‟t believe in. 
 Does not identify with a certain party 
 
“C”: Female, 30s, Teacher - January 25 – February 3, 2011 
 Does not identify with a certain party 
 Proud of mobilization, as long as cause is just.  Does not approve of current piqueteros, 
but approves of mobilization during 2001 and current student mobilizations. 
 Student mobilizations – hopes that one day, they will be the future leaders of the country 
 Mobilization as an accountability mechanism 
 
Male, 30s, Worker - February 1, 2011 
 Politicians are inexperienced, do not have enough expertise 
 There are good and bad politicians, but it is easy to get corrupted once they enter the 
system 
 “I don‟t think there need to be political parties anymore” 
 Still in the process of learning how democracy works 
 Does not believe in justice system, but the rest he trusts 
 2001 – “It was good, very good... It was a movement that said „no‟ to everything... We 
changed things.”  
 
 
 
Female, 18, Student - January 28, 2011 
 Believes that representational participation is more important than mobilization.  Need to 
have some someone to hold accountable. 
 Organizations serve an important role, “citizens need to co-participate” 
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 “All forms of participation are important, they‟re just different” 
 There is a lot of fraud in elections.  Says it is important to educate young people about 
things like that so that “they don‟t step on us from above” 
 
Male, 18, Student - January 28, 2011 
 Not interested in politics 
 All politicians the same 
 Proud of history of mobilization in Argentina 
 Says he feels that he will participate one day, but doesn‟t want to get involved until he‟s 
older 
 
Male, 50s, Artesan - January 28, 2011 
 
 Did not want to talk about politics, avoided conversation once topic was brought up 
 Said that there is not representation in national institutions 
 Maintained that the type of participation he believed in at the local-level, and mostly in 
social organizations (member of Alcoholics Anonymous, recovered alcoholic, still active 
in organization). 
 
Male 40s, Artesan - January 29, 2011 
 “people do not have a lot of means to participate... politics is very inaccessible” 
 Has been running an inter-cultural festival every year for twenty years.  Does not want 
politicians or parties involved, despite their offers for funding.  “They have an agenda, 
they ruin it”.  Thinks that they will corrupt it, sees it as a pure form of democracy “does 
not have limits or conditions”. 
 Importance of local participation 
 Sees local participation as a means of changing peoples‟ perceptions about democracy.   
 
Meeting of Civil Society Organizations of Carlos Paz - January 30, 2011 
 
Diputada Cecilia Merchan - January 30, 2011 
 “Argentina has a vast history of civic participation... A tradition of people coming 
together to find their own, alternative solutions... All that happened in 2001 is still 
present in the consciousness of the people” 
 
Diputado “Pino” Solana - January 30, 2011 
 “Things do not change unless people unite and make noise... When problems hit 
the news, it becomes dynamite to power... What mobilization brings is social 
pressure.” 
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 “What seemed impossible is not impossible.  When the cause is just, and it has the 
popular support and mobilization, it brings sensibility, and it will be remembered 
the week of the vote.” 
 “Everything that has been accomplished in the last years has been though large 
mobilizations” 
 
Eduardo Mercat - January 30, 2011 
 “I believe we can help you with two things: 1 is the topic of the environment, the 
2
nd
 is to democratize democracy” 
 
Male, 50s, Food Distributor - February 2, 2011 
 Says he‟s a pure “Kirchnerista” 
 Goes to party meetings every week.  Says the meetings are very open. 
 Has confidence in the vote 
 
 
Male, 30s, Used to live in Córdoba, but left in 2002, currently lives in Spain – February 2, 2011 
 “Now we are more represented than ever... For the first time, all sectors are represented” 
 “I support the government because they are doing good things, that they democratically 
represent the people better than any other government” 
 “2001 served to remind us of the power that the people had... because of that, there was a 
real change in 2003” 
 Believes that participation needs to start at the local level. 
 “I feel represented by the government, but not be any party” 
 
Female, 20s, Chef – February 2, 2011 
 Distrusts all politicians 
 Talked about the political uprising in Santiago de Estero 
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Appendix E: Interview Notes – Chile 
 
San Fernando and Surrounding Areas, Chile 
 
Male, 30s, lives in San Fernando, lawyer, politician – February 24-28, 2011 
 Said that because of the set-up of the government, local politicians, especially mayors can 
obtain huge amounts of power and become like small-scale dictators 
 Through litigation, he has managed to through two corrupt mayors out of office 
 Family very involved in politics – One cousin is a diputado, another is a mayor.  He 
wants to run for mayor in the next election. 
 Told various stories that emphasized social stratification 
 Said that most  local problems were solved by favors and connections within upper levels 
of society 
 
Javier Macaya, 29, lives around San Fernando, Diputado 34 District, Union Democrata 
Independiente (Independent Democratic Union Party – far right party) - February 25, 2011  
 “healthy and successful transition” 
 Politicians need to have stronger ties to the people 
 Mobilization prohibits the ability of the government to initiate necessary reforms 
 Many politicians do not want the parties‟ paths to change 
 Citizens do not have much civic education, they do not understand politics 
 
Juan Paulo Molina, 30s, Alcalde comuna San Fernando (Mayor of San Fernando), Partido 
Democracia Cristiana (Christian Democratic Party – center-left party) – February 28, 2011 
 Mayor will see any citizen who comes to their office to talk to them.  When I arrived for 
the interview, there was a line of at least thirty people waiting to talk to him. 
 Various projects in Congress to encourage electoral participation, especially among youth 
population 
 “When the dictatorship ended, I was 20 years old... I had no idea what democracy was 
like.  It is a learning and realization process, but also one of great responsibility...” 
 Main weakness of Chilean democracy is the lack of civic education, especially regarding 
rights and responsibilities of citizenship 
 Non-electoral participation should be logical, that an organization of citizens should 
petition a government authority, who will then pass their concerns to the government. 
 “The people are much more demanding today than before” 
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Mario Gonzalez, 40s, lives in San Fernando, Concejal de comuna San Fernando (Councilman in 
San Fernando), Partido Socialista (Socialist Party) – February 28, 2011 
 Constitution is a major impediment to Chilean democracy 
 Centralization is a big problem. “The power is in Santiago” 
 Exclusive political system 
 Not very many avenues available for participation 
 
Male, 50s, lives in Santiago and Puertocillo, works in transportation – February 27, 2011  
 Government was “stale” from lack of change, was more hopeful with election of 
Piñera 
 When speaking of Allende, said how disgraceful it was that people had to line up in 
the street to get food 
 Said his family had connections to the president and that they 
always got food from the president‟s house, not to mention other 
items that the rest of the public couldn‟t get 
 
Female, 50s, lives in Santiago and Puertocillo, works as a baker – February 27, 2011 
 “soy apolitica” – from conservative family that supported Pinochet, and contributes 
that to her distrust and dislike of politics 
 No matter what party they are from or what they claim, I feel that all politicians 
always have their own agendas. 
 
Male, 60s, lives outside of San Fernando, from aristocratic family, owns own winery and bottled 
water company – February 24, 2011 
 Lives by himself in an isolated location, not very connected to the outside world 
 Told his memories about the Allende period and how horrible it was, that he was young 
and he and his brothers were guarding their house with guns because the workers kept 
trying to violently take their home.  He was glad that the coup happened, because the 
country was “out of control”, and felt that whatever lives were lost during the military 
government were necessary and that, given the current state of the country, “maybe it did 
not go far enough”.  
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Santiago, Chile 
 
Joint Interview: 
Female, 30s, lives in Santiago, used to work for government, studied political science 
And  
Male, 30s, lives in Santiago, psychologist 
 – February 28, 2011 
 Looked favorably upon government-run programs 
 Stressed the ideological division between the left and the right 
 Suggested that participation is combination of Chilean tradition and results of 
dictatorship 
 Said to be careful about framing of questions, that many on the right still look favorably 
on the dictatorship  
 
Mauricio Morales, Professor at the Universidad de Diego Portales, specialty in Chilean electoral 
studies – March 1, 2011 
 Advisory meeting 
 Said that Juan Pablo Luna‟s piece on the UDI is good – that it shows how the party is 
reaching out to sectors that it previously had not associated with (parties losing their links 
to the people, need to attract more voters) 
o Parties are traditionally extremely organized, lost that for a while, but now are 
extending beyond where they used to in order to form organizations “at the 
bottom”. 
 Gave several resources on Chilean electoral system 
 Brief explanation of mandatory vote proposal 
 No noticable difference in party identification between younger and older generations 
 
Joint interview with: 
Dr. Miguel Angel Lopez, Professor at the Institute for International Studies, University of Chile  
And 
Dr. Ricardo Gamboa, Professor at the Institute for International Studies, University of Chile 
– March 2, 2011 
 Advisory meeting 
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 Brief discussion of behavioralist argument (low interpersonal trust, low association with 
organizations, social, political, or otherwise) 
 Said that Chile has never had the history of mobilization that Argentina has (unions not 
as strong, government reaction against mobilization - all factors intensified more during 
military regime) 
 Mentioned their suspicion that most Chileans do not organize at all, except maybe 
religious or sports groups 
 Said to look up “Penguin Revolution” and mobilizations in Puerto Sur, as well as 
neighborhood meetings, Instituto Libertad, Libertad Desarrollo, and post-authoritarian 
history of student organizations 
 History of grassroots organizations and mobilization not a tradition in Chile as it is in 
Argentina 
 Government policy in Chile encourages traditional participation 
 
Dr. Jaime Baeza, Professor at the Universidad de Chile – March 3, 2011 
 “In Argentina, they are unable to be part of the institutional framework... there are 
rational incentives for participation because they see that participation can produce 
change and think „my input was important‟.  Whereas in Chile, people think „it doesn‟t 
make any difference... the system is going to be the same, the parties are going to be the 
same‟....” 
 “People in Chile still believe in the formal system, even if they don‟t take part in it” 
 Choices about participation are a direct result of individual perceptions 
 
Dr. Juan Pablo Luna, Professor at the Universidad Catolica – March 8, 2011 
 People do not care about and do not feel represented by the parties 
 Even though parties are institutionalized, they are very weak. 
 Politics becoming more personalistic 
 Very party-focused system, “people not used to engaging in politics outside of the 
parties” 
 Spasmodic protest, like student protests or gas protests, but “anomic”, not organized 
 With parties having less importance, results in a vacuum 
 Parties – “They are lost... They are elite... I see two trends: one is to do twitter and 
facebook... the other is to create a new relato, a new model that really mobilizes people... 
as an attempt to get votes without interacting with the people” 
 “They know they are in crisis” but no party has been able to come up with a strategy 
 Fragmentation of society leads to lack of capacity to organize mobilization 
 
Male, 40s, works in tourism, worked for several government administrations – March 8, 2011 
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 Worked with various government administrations, especially creating civilian 
organizations that encouraged social participation. 
 Any mobilization received permit and permission from the government 
 Does not work with current government, as they do not encourage such programs 
 Youth do not have opportunity to participate in politics 
 People see politics as corrupt, many enter in order to make money 
 Individualism and lack of encouragement from government to blame for disaffection 
 
Male, 20s, from Santiago, student – March 9, 2011 
 Does not like Piñera (focusing on personality) 
 Does not like political parties.  Does not think that they represent the people 
 Whenever he is with friends, they do not talk about politics.  If politics comes up, they 
change the topic.  Could not explain why, but just said that they did not like politics, that 
they do not believe anything they hear about it, and that they do not want to have 
anything to do with it. 
 After spending a couple of days with him, and he heard me asking his father and 
politicians questions, he began to ask more questions and take more of an interest.  He 
said to me towards the end of my trip that he liked the idea of the mandatory vote because 
he thought it would make people pay more attention to politics and know what is going 
on in the country. 
 
Male, 40s, from Southern Chile, lives in Santiago, works for television station – March 9, 2011 
 Member of student organization during dictatorship 
 Used to go to secret bars and meet with other sympathizers 
 Always had to be afraid, even at home, because the secret police had spies 
everywhere – they could have been your neighbors, your mailman, etc. 
 People were even afraid when elections were called.  There were many codes to 
communicate about the plebiscite – like you would turn on your windshield 
wipers as you passed another car to show that you were in favor of democracy.  
Other people thought that they would be tortured if they did not vote for Pinochet, 
because he had tampered with elections in the past. 
 In the student movement, felt proud of protesting.  Sense of accomplishment, 
even today, that they brought democracy back to their country.  Isn‟t perfect, but 
it is necessary to work to progress the system along. 
 Did not vote for Piñera.  Could not vote for someone from the right because there 
are still many people in that party who supported Pinochet. 
 
Male, 20s, from Santiago, lived 3 yrs in USA, student – March 7, 2011 
 Inequality major problem. Elitism 
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 Same people have been in power and they do not want things to change, therefore it is 
very hard to change the system. 
o Voting the only way to actually influence politics, but that doesn‟t mean that a 
politician who thinks differently will get into power 
 
Former student organization leader, works in Concertación‟s think tank – March 11, 2011 
 President of a university student organization in the 1990s 
 Incorporation of organization leaders into party system – says that some thought it was 
intentional, to co-opt the youth that rebelled against Pinochet, but maybe it‟s just a 
natural process... 
 Student organizations used to have strong ties to the government and especially to 
political parties, but every year it is less 
 Discussion of path that country and government policy takes does not include people 
outside of the government 
 Politicians know that people feel estranged from the government 
 Both people and polticians are “condemned to be disappointed” 
 Politicians are disillusioned because they know that there is this disaffection, but they do 
not know how to fix it 
 Obligatory vote is one mechanism that some politicians think will help disaffection, also 
believe that it is a citizen responsibility to vote.  He does not think that the public will 
react well to the government requiring them to vote, that it will only make the problem 
worse. 
 When asked what he felt needed to be done to strengthen democracy in Chile, he 
responded that local democracy needs to be strengthened (decentralization), that the 
parties need a coherent strategy (noted that many politicians just look for fame and that 
“neither parties nor the parliament are places for the generation of ideas”. 
 Said that student organizations have not really mobilized en mass since the dictatorship, 
that in the 1990s they focused on demands that were specifically directed towards their 
school and that now they focus on social work and very small protests 
 When asked his opinion on why Chileans do not mobilize much, he said that the 
dictatorship generated demobilization, and that the dictatorship destroyed the “social 
fabric” of the society and put individualism in its place, resulting in a distrust in 
mobilization 
 
Eugenio Tironi, from Santiago, professor, political consultant – March 16, 2011 
 “I believe that Chilean democracy is functioning well... but there is a great deficit in 
participation... there is little disagreement, few disruptive dilemmas... and people are not 
attracted to politics because they are busy with their personal lives” 
 “It is true that young people see politics as very distant... politicians know that it is going 
on, but they have little incentive to find a solution since the youth are not registered to 
vote... If registration becomes mandatory, it will change this.  There will no longer be a 
 92 
captive public, but a more free-floating one... Politics will be much more personalistic 
and more like entertainment” 
 The parties are not changing.  “I do not see one, not one, change... They are not interested 
in changing things.” 
 
Student organization leader in Universidad Catolica – Email interview – April 4, 2011 (See 
email in Appendix D). 
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Appendix F: Email from Student Leader 
 
April 4, 2011 
 
- ¿Para empezar, me podrías explicar un poco de tu experiencia como dirigente, cuales 
actividades/participación hace la organización, y que ideologia es dominante, actualmente, en 
ella? 
 
Yo comencé como dirigente el año 2009, año en el cual fui presidente del Centro de Estudiantes 
de Filosofía. En ese entonces, conocí a muchos miembros de la Nueva Acción Universitaria 
(NAU) que participaban del Consejo de Presidentes. El Consejo de Presidentes es una instancia 
que agrupa a los representantes estudiantiles de la universidad católica y que tiene como objetivo 
principal el discutir las posiciones de las distintas carreras respecto a temas de contingencia 
nacional o de relevancia para nuestra universidad. Como te decía, allí conocí a mucho miembros 
del NAU que también eran representantes. El NAU es un movimiento político de centro 
izquierda que nace el año 2009 y que gana la elección para ser representante de los estudiantes 
de la universidad. 
 
Mi experiencia como dirigente comienza entonces en el ambiente de un movimiento que venía a 
traer un nuevo tema a la UC: la reforma a la educación superior. Ese tema lo tocamos durante 
largos meses y en medio de la discusión conocí a quienes me acompañarían hasta el día de hoy 
en la representación estudiantil. Me hice parte del movimiento el segundo semestre del 2009. El 
2010 estuve de intercambio en Alemania por 7 meses (hasta septiembre de ese año) y, no 
convencido de quedarme otro semestre, decidí volver a la política estudiantil. Allí me postulé 
como Consejero Superior, el cargo de más alta representación en la universidad junto al 
presidente de la Federación, y salí elegido a finales del 2010. 
 
Mi experiencia como dirigente estos últimos 3 años han sido muy enriquecedoras. He aprendido 
el modo en que funciona la universidad, la poca ingerencia que tenemos los estudiantes en su 
desarrollo y la manera de lograr cambios relevantes. Por otra parte, he descubierto maneras de 
formar opinión y de transmitir información, una cosa antes vedada o desconocida para un 
estudiante común y corriente. Es una experiencia enriquecedora, pero a veces desalentadora: uno 
se da cuenta que es muy difícil mover piedras que llevan años estancadas. 
  
 
- ¿Tiene un papel político fuera de la universidad?  ¿Por que o por que no? 
 
Actualmente no tengo ninguna porque estoy concentrado en llevar a cabo mi tarea como 
representante estudiantil. Es un cargo que dura solamente un año y que no deja mucho tiempo 
para el resto. Me gustaría, sin embargo, poder influír más a nivel nacional con las actividades o 
propuestas que hacemos. Esta año hemos comenzado, por ejemplo, con un periódico mensual 
que intenta poner la mirada de los estudiantes frente a diferentes temas que la universidad a 
veces es reticente a tocar: el tipo de gobierno universitario, la aceptación de la diversidad de 
pensamiento, los temas permitidos y la poca participación de la comunidad. Por otra parte, 
hemos enfocado nuestro quehacer en tres áreas: docencia e investigación (en especial 
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investigación estudiantil), derechos de los estudiantes y democracia. Para cada uno de esos temas 
hay una o más actividades que intentan poner temas que inviten a la reflexión. 
  
 
- ¿Personalmente, por que elegiste participar de este forma? 
 
La política es una plataforma que desde tiempos remotos ha sido considerada como un espacio 
ideal para instaurar nuevas maneras de pensar o nuevas formas de hacer las cosas. En la política 
confluyen las distintas miradas con las cuales se mira el hombre, la sociedad y la manera en que 
ésta debiese organizarse. Yo, por mi talante filosófico de estudiante de filosofía, me di cuenta 
que era allí donde quería desarrollar y difundir mi ideas. Claramente la política no es el único 
espacio desde donde se puede construir o cambiar la sociedad, pero es sin duda uno de los más 
relevantes. 
  
 
- ¿Que opinas del sistema político Chileno?  ¿Hay cosas que cambiarías si pudieras? 
Le sistema político chileno en una visión comparada con, por ejemplo, el resto de latinoamérica, 
posee bastantes cosas buenas, pero también bastantes cosas malas. Partamos por lo bueno. Es sin 
duda un sistema político que comparativamente cuenta con muy bajos sistemas de corrupción, no 
lidia con grupos narcotraficantes y ha logrado mantener un sistema más o menos democrático en 
los últimos 20 años. Sin embargo, falta muchísimo por avanzar. Partiendo  por los sistemas de 
elección de autoridades, que descartan cualquier posibilidad de dar espacios a las minorías y se 
ha consagrado como un espacio de permanente lucha de los grandes poderes tradicionales, 
siguiendo por los pocos espacios de participación y formación de ciudadanía que se mantienen y 
terminando por el alto nivel de desvinculación con la realidad multicultural y diversa de nuestra 
población, de norte a sur. Somos un país aún muy centrista y poco generoso con las regiones y 
muy tendiente a desarrollar políticas de moda sin reflexionar las consecuencias que ello trae para 
la población en determinados sectores. 
 
Cambiaría el sistema de representación Creo que avanzar hacia un parlamentarismo no sería una 
mala idea. Parte de los problemas de la democracia radican en la gratiuta concentración del poder 
en el presidente de la nación. Avanzar hacia un parlamentarismo que tome más en cuenta la 
diversidad regional, étnica y religiosa de nuestro país sería un gran avance. Por otra parte, 
desarrollar nuevas formas de ciudadanía o de consciencia ciudadana sería fundamental para que 
los hoy ciudadanos-consumidores se auto-proclamaran dueños de sus derechos. Propongo que no 
son dueños, porque poco conocen los derechos que tienen o las cosas que pueden exigir. 
 
  
- ¿Que esperas lograr, o que efecto esperas tener, ambos individualmente y como organización 
en cualquier sentido (político, social, ect)?   
 
Creo que el NAU nace como movimiento político universitario y su efecto ha sido el formar 
liderazgos que seguramente el día de mañana tendrán algo que decir de la política del país. 
Personalmente esta época en la política universitaria y en el movimiento han tenido un alto 
impacto en mis intereses y claramente algo estaré metido en la política en los años venideros. 
Creo que la diversidad de opiniones que hemos traído ha significado un gran avance a nivel 
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universitario, en especial en temas de sustentabiliad, reforma a la educación superior y en los 
derechos de los estudiantes. Los aportes, creo, se verán en el largo plazo. 
 
Consejero Superior 
Federación Estudiantes 
Universidad Católica 
 
